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ABSTRACT 
While certain minority groups have gained acceptance in contemporary American 
society, others continue to experience high levels of bias. Currently, Muslims are one of 
the most “othered” social groups in American society. In this research, I examine social 
bias toward Muslims, with a specific focus on Muslim women who veil. Using a 2 (skin 
tone) X 3 (veil coverage) between-subjects experimental design, participants were shown 
a female face, and asked to answer a number of survey items designed to measure social 
bias. Measures of social bias included: attraction, similarity, social distance, moral 
outrage and stereotypes. There were six experimental conditions in which respondents 
were assigned to view one of six images of a female face, which varied in terms of skin 
tone and type of head covering.  
I find that veil coverage is an important predictor of social bias. In most cases, 
when controlling for all other variables, as veil coverage increased, so did social bias. 
There were also statistically significant differences in social bias based on skin tone. 
Participants reported significantly less similarity and understanding toward dark skinned 
targets than light skinned targets. Participants also suggested that dark skinned targets 
had significantly less social status then light skinned targets. When the main effects of 
skin tone and veil coverage interacted, social bias based on veil coverage was more 
pronounced for light skinned targets.  Overall, social bias was better predicted by veil 
coverage than skin tone, which indicated that religion, as derived from veil coverage, is 
more important in predicting social bias than race, as derived from skin tone. In addition, 
Islamophobia, or the fear of Muslims, helped to predict social bias toward Muslim 
xv 
 
 
women who veil. As Islamophobia increased, social bias toward veiled targets also 
increased. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent research has found that the majority of Americans agree that they value 
having diverse people in their communities. However, not all minority groups are 
accepted equally. While certain minority groups, like Asian Americans, have gained 
acceptance in contemporary American society, others, like Muslims, continue to 
experience high levels of bias. A recent survey found that Americans rate Muslims as the 
most distrusted social group (“Boundaries in the American Mosaic,” 2013). My research 
examines bias toward Muslims, with a specific focus on Muslim women who veil. Using 
a web experiment, I develop a better understanding of this bias. 
This research focuses specifically on Americans’ attitudes and bias toward 
Muslim women who veil. My focus on Muslim women is deliberate. In light of recent 
events, like the Boston Marathon bombing and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, in 
addition to the continual relevance of 9/11, it is no surprise that many Americans hold 
negative attitudes toward Muslims. Additionally, recent survey data suggests that there is 
a fundamental gap between how Muslim Americans view themselves and how the 
general American public perceives them. While Muslim Americans consider themselves 
as highly assimilated to American society, nearly thirty percent (27%) of Americans 
indicated that they believe Muslims are changing the American culture and way of life 
for the worse (Pew Research Center, 2011). It is apparent that attitudes and bias towards 
Muslims are pressing social and political issues that deserve further attention.  
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In an attempt to both explore a unique way of measuring social bias and to 
develop a deeper understanding of the sources of bias toward Muslim women who veil, I 
conducted a web experiment. Using a 2 (skin tone) X 3 (veil coverage) between-subjects 
experimental design, participants were shown a female face, and asked to answer a 
number of survey items. There were six experimental conditions in which six images of 
female faces varied in terms of skin color and type of head covering. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the six target female faces: light skin with no veil, light skin 
with hijab, light skin with niqab, dark skin with no veil, dark skin with hijab, and dark 
skin with niqab. In the survey, participants were shown a target face and responded to a 
series of questions designed to measure social bias. The questions addressed: attraction, 
similarity, social distance, moral outrage and stereotypes. Participants also answered 
questions about Islam and secularism. In addition to better understanding bias toward 
Muslim women who veil, this research attempts to determine what the social bias toward 
Muslim women is based on, with a specific focus on race, as derived from skin tone, and 
religion, as derived from veil coverage. In this paper, the term veil will sometimes be 
used generically in referring to the two types of veil that are explored in this research – 
the hijab, which covers the hair, but not the face, and the niqab, which covers the hair and 
entire face except for the eyes.  
The significance of this research is that it helps shed some light on why Muslims, 
specifically Muslim women who veil, continue to experience high levels of bias in 
contemporary American society. Not only does this research contribute to the 
understanding of social bias toward Muslim women who veil, it helps to determine the 
ultimate source of such bias. Using social identity theory, social boundaries, and 
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intersectionality, I will formulate research hypotheses that reflect the sources of bias with 
a particular focus on how skin tone and veil coverage impact bias.  
In the following chapter, I will discuss the relevant literature with a specific focus 
on measuring social bias and bias toward Muslim women who veil. I will also outline the 
theoretical framework that informed my research hypotheses and list my hypotheses. In 
Chapter Three I will discuss methodology. I will describe participant characteristics and 
how the experiment was conducted. I will also address all of the variables of interest and 
how they were measured. In Chapter Four I will present the results of the research, and in 
Chapter Five I will discuss the implications of the results, the limitations of the study and 
will provide suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter, I will first discuss the literature on social bias with a particular 
focus on the difficulties associated with measuring social bias. Second, I will discuss the 
literature on social bias toward Muslims with a specific focus on social bias toward 
Muslim women who veil. Third, I will describe the inspiration for the current research. 
Fourth, I will propose the theoretical framework that informed the hypotheses of this 
study. Lastly, I will outline the research hypotheses. 
Social Bias 
 In order to fully understand social bias, it is helpful to situate the topic within the 
broader area of attitude research. While the prevalence of attitude research within the 
field of social psychology has ebbed and flowed, Allport’s 1935 claim that attitudes are 
“the most distinctive and indispensable concept in American social psychology” (p. 798) 
largely holds true today. Attitudes result from and elicit three types of processes: 
affective, behavioral, and cognitive (widely known as the tripartite model or the A, B, Cs 
of attitudes) (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). When considering attitudes toward Muslims, 
researchers may be able to determine an individual’s attitude based on their feelings, their 
behaviors and their beliefs toward Muslims. For example, an individual’s attitude may 
involve their emotions or feelings tied to 9/11 (affect). Attitudes toward Muslims may be 
tied to one’s avoidance of individuals or groups who appear to be Muslim (behavior). 
Finally, attitudes towards Muslims may correspond to beliefs about the group (e.g., 
Muslims are terrorists) (cognitive) (Fiske, 2010).  
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When considering the relationship between attitudes and social bias it is important 
to note that bias stems from a category-based response, or reaction to an individual as an 
interchangeable member of a social group. Similar to the tripartite model of attitudes, 
social bias may result in three corresponding responses: prejudice, discrimination, and/or 
stereotyping. Prejudice, or emotional reactions to an individual based on one’s feelings 
about a group, is an affective bias. Discrimination, or denying equality based on one’s 
stereotypes and prejudices, is a behavioral bias. Stereotyping, or applying one’s beliefs 
about a group to an individual is a cognitive bias (Fiske, 2010). In addition, certain 
individuals may experience extreme forms of bias if they carry a socially constructed 
stigma, or discredited not fully human status. Erving Goffman (1963) is best known for 
work in this area. Goffman, a famous symbolic interactionist, defines three types of 
stigma: stigma resulting from physical deformities (e.g., a cleft palate), stigma that arises 
due to individual character blemishes (e.g., mental disorder), or stigma based on race, 
nation and religion.  
Although it is apparent that stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are all 
related, it is important to point out that they represent unique forms of bias. For example, 
people may hold stereotypical thoughts, but not act on them or people may have strong 
prejudices without accompanying stereotypical beliefs. This research focuses on 
prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination, which are measured with a series questions 
designed to capture participants’ beliefs, emotional reactions, and anticipated actions in 
regards to a series of target faces.  
Measuring Social Bias. Attitudes and bias are measured in numerous ways. They 
can be measured directly, indirectly or with psychophysiological measures. Most 
6 
 
 
commonly, attitudes are measured with self-reports. These direct, or explicit, measures of 
bias often take the form of a survey or questionnaire, in which participants indicate their 
responses to a series of questions and scales. One common self-report measure is the 
Symbolic Racism Scale, which is a modern measure of racism in which items that focus 
on prejudice are concealed among a variety of other questions about political attitudes 
(Henry & Sears, 2002). Numerous researchers have found that self-reported responses to 
direct attitude questions tend to be highly context dependent, meaning that minimal 
changes in things like question wording, survey format, and question order drastically 
affect the results. For instance, the term “drugs” takes on a different meaning in the 
context of a survey on health insurance than in the context of a survey on crime 
(Schwarz, 2008). In addition, open response format may produce very different results 
than closed response format. For example, when respondents were asked what they 
consider to be most important in preparing children for life, over half of respondents 
selected “to think for themselves” when it was part of a list. When an open response 
format was used, fewer than five percent of respondents indicated a similar answer 
(Schuman & Presser, 1981). Furthermore, question order can impact responses. 
Assimilation effects occur when positive (negative) information results in a more positive 
(negative) judgment (Schwartz, 2008). For example, when participants are asked about 
general life satisfaction and marriage satisfaction, there is a stronger correlation when 
marital satisfaction questions are asked first, which indicated that when marriage was 
brought up, participants included their marital satisfaction in their assessment of their 
lives in general. Happily married couples reported higher general life satisfaction than 
unhappily married couples when their attention was first drawn to questions regarding 
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their marriage, followed by questions regarding general satisfaction (Schwarz, Strack, & 
Mai, 1991).  
To combat the problems associated with direct self-reports researchers have 
developed more indirect methods to measure attitudes and bias. These measures 
frequently utilize implicit attitudes. Unlike explicit measures, implicit measures do not 
require that participants are aware of their attitudes. Methods that utilize implicit attitudes 
examine evaluations or feelings that cannot be consciously controlled or contemplated 
(Devos, 2008). Decades ago, implicit attitudes were measured with sequential priming 
techniques in which participants were shown the name of an attitude object followed by a 
positive or negative adjective. Participants were asked to indicate, as quickly as possible, 
if the target word was positive or negative. The idea was that if the attitude object elicited 
a negative implicit attitude then the response to the negative adjective would be quicker 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).  
Currently, the most widely used implicit measures rely on response latency, or the 
period of time between the introduction of a stimulus and a detected response 
(Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). The best known response latency 
measure is the Implicit Association Test, or the IAT. Through a series of five sections, 
this test “measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g. black people, gay 
people) and evaluations (e.g. good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g. athletic, clumsy). The main 
idea is that making a response is easier when closely related items share the same 
response key” (Project Implicit, 2011). Along similar lines, another implicit attitude 
measure, the Go/No-Go Association Test (GNAT) asks participants to match concepts 
with positive or negative words by either pressing the spacebar (“go”) or not (“no go”). 
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The advantage of this method is that it can assess the strength of an association between a 
concept and its evaluation (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). 
While implicit measures are widely-used and highly regarded methods of attitude 
and bias measurement, they are not without criticism. For instance, researchers find that 
implicit measures, much like explicit ones, are also context dependent and can be 
influenced by things like interviewer race and ethnicity. For example, in a study 
conducted by Wittenbrink, Judd and Park (2001), participants indicated more positive 
automatic evaluations of African Americans when the experimenter was black rather than 
white. In this case, the experimenters may act as a highly accessible positive example that 
influenced participant evaluations of the group in general. Even though the IAT has 
sparked numerous critiques regarding the validity of the measure, a meta-analysis 
conducted by Greenwald et al. (2009) found that the IAT is particularly effective when 
dealing with sensitive subjects, like bias. This meta-analysis reviewed 122 studies, which 
included more than 14,000 participants and found that while explicit measures had a 
stronger predictability of behavioral, judgment, and physiological measures than implicit 
measures, the predictive validity of self-report responses was weakened for socially 
sensitive topics. For instance, when looking at Black-white interracial behavior, the 
validity of the IAT significantly exceeded self-report measures.   
A final way of measuring attitudes and bias is with psychophysiological 
measures. Psychophysiological measures used by social psychologists include skin 
conductance (sweating), changes in facial expression, heart rate and brain activity. For 
example, while electrodermal (skin conductance) measures are common since they are 
relatively easy to obtain, they are problematic in that they are unable to reflect the 
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direction of the response, whether it be favorable or unfavorable. Changes in a 
participant’s facial expression are more useful in that they can reflect both the direction 
and extremity of the response. These measures are often tricky to obtain, though, because 
unrelated facial movements may alter the response. Changes in heart rate, or pulse, is 
another physiological measure that is frequently used by experimental social 
psychologists. Finally, brain activity can be measured by recording electric signals 
through electroencephalography (EEG). While this method cannot directly assess positive 
or negative responses, the direction of the evaluation is determined based on the fact that 
unexpected stimuli induce brain activity different from the activity evoked by expected 
stimuli. While these techniques may be the most unbiased measures of attitudes, they 
require expensive and sophisticated training and equipment that may not be readily 
available (Schwarz, 2008). 
Experimental Design. An advantage of experimental design is the opportunity for 
random assignment. While subjects may not be randomly selected, and often should not 
be, they can be randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Experimenters can utilize 
random assignment by unsystematically (e.g., flipping a coin) assigning participants to 
various experimental conditions in which they are exposed to different levels of 
independent variables. The significance of this randomization is that it ensures that 
researchers do not create group differences. Therefore, any observed difference in the 
dependent variable can only be attributed to the experimenter’s manipulation of the 
independent variable or chance. This experimental control allows the researcher to make 
statements about causality between the independent and dependent variables (Haslam & 
McGarty, 2004). No other sociological method has this power. For this reason, I have 
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developed a web experiment to study bias toward Muslim women who veil. Since I 
utilized student volunteers as participants, I was not able to get a random sample. 
However, using a random number generator, I was able to randomly assign participants 
to each of my experimental conditions and ensure that any differences in the dependent 
variables are due to my experimental manipulation or chance. 
Social Bias toward Muslims 
Muslims are people who follow the religion of Islam. Not all Arabs are Muslims; 
in the U.S. only about 25 percent of Arab Americans identify as Muslims. Still, it is 
difficult to provide a discussion of attitudes toward Muslim Americans without also 
addressing Arabs. Given that Americans get a majority of their information on Muslims 
from the news, it is important to recognize the role of the media when examining 
Americans’ attitudes towards Muslim Americans. In their examination of U.S. news 
reports, Nacos and Torre-Reyna (2002) found that news media outlets tend to report on 
Muslims and Arabs in the same stories, both in the U.S. and abroad and more 
significantly, were likely to use the terms in an interchangeable fashion. While it is 
crucial to point out that not all Muslims are from Arab countries, and that not all Arabs 
are Muslim, many Americans do not make this distinction. Since my research focuses on 
Americans’ attitudes, I utilize the histories and identities of both Muslims and Arabs 
since the overlap and interchangeability of the two groups seems to reflect widely held 
beliefs.  
Muslims as “others.” This current research draws on the work of Edgell, Gerteis 
& Hartmann (2006) and the American Mosaic Project, which is a nationally 
representative, multi-method study that examines how Americans understand ethnic, 
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religious and racial diversity. When the study was conducted a decade ago, Americans 
indicated that atheists were the most “othered” social group. However, when the study 
was replicated in 2014, Muslims surpassed atheists as the most “othered” group in 
American society. Throughout this paper I refer the “other” or “othered” in terms of 
Schwalbe, Godwin, Holden, Schrock, Thompson, & Wolkimer’s (2000) concept of 
oppressive othering, or the process through which “one group seeks advantage by 
defining another group as morally and/or intellectually inferior” (p. 423). Respondents 
reported the highest levels of distrust and marriage disapproval for Muslims in the most 
recent wave of the study (“Boundaries in the American Mosaic,” 2014). This recent data, 
along with a history of exclusion for Muslims indicates the need to further explore the 
social bias toward this highly “othered” group.  
 A History of Exclusion. While Muslims have always faced some degree of 
exclusion in American society, in the past they had been afforded the option to be labeled 
as white, or perhaps “white, but not quite” (Samhan, 1999) is a more accurate description, 
and therefore remain hidden. After 9/11 however, Muslim Americans no longer had the 
option to remain invisible. Those perceived to be Arabs and Muslims were held 
collectively responsible for the attacks of 9/11 and views of their collective status as a 
“backward or barbaric” culture were widely held among Americans (Cainkar, 2008). 
While American prejudice toward most minority groups has decreased in recent decades, 
this is not the case for Muslims. In fact, since 9/11, Muslims in the United States have 
faced higher levels of intolerance than ever before (Cainkar, 2002; Edgell et al., 2006; 
Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). Although this increased level of prejudice may be 
new, Muslims’ history of exclusion from American society goes much deeper.  
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Historically, political and social segregation may help to explain present-day 
exclusion of Muslim and Arab Americans. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a series of 
U.S. governmental actions led to the profiling of Arabs in America. In most cases, Arab-
Americans were not afforded the same civil rights as other citizens and were unable to 
exercise their freedom of speech, which resulted in political voicelessness (Cainkar, 
2002). Furthermore, Arab-Americans were also excluded at the community level, and 
access was only available for light-skinned Arabs.  
September 11 led to further alienation of this already excluded group. Out of the 
20 new rules, regulations and laws directed at immigrants and non-immigrant visitors to 
the US, 15 largely targeted Arabs. Some consequences have been profiling of Arabs at 
U.S. airports, holds on visa applications, monitoring of Arabs living and attending school 
in the U.S., and deportation of non-citizen Arab males (“Illinois Coalition”). Amongst 
these negative impacts, there are some good things that have occurred for Arab 
Americans since 9/11. There has been an increase in the desire for public education about 
Islam. For instance, in a major initiative backed by the Chicago Community Trust, 
Chicago public school systems explored ways to change class curriculums to include the 
study of Arabs, Islam and the Middle East (Cainkar, 2002). The events of 9/11 have also 
led to a significant increase in conversions to Islam in the US. Although difficult to get an 
accurate count, it is estimated that up to 20,000 Americans convert to Islam each year 
(Scirbey, 2011), which suggests that for perhaps the first time ever, Islam is being 
recognized as an American religion.  
Religious Identity. Louise Cainkar (2002), a leading scholar of the study of 
Muslims in the U.S., suggests that the development of a Muslim religious identity was a 
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crucial element in dealing with the history of exclusion. In many cases, historical 
exclusion resulted in the development of transnational identities for Arab immigrants. 
Many first-generation immigrants embraced a national Arab identity and identified as 
Americans only secondarily. Many American-born Arab children felt differently, though, 
and favored a fully American identity. While some Arabs focused on their national 
identity, this was not the case for all immigrants, many of whom wanted to mask their 
Arab identities. To do this they changed their names to American versions and socially 
organized with non-Arabs. Regardless, Arab immigrants experienced a more flawless 
incorporation into American society if they were Christian, which corresponded to 
whiteness. In the 1990s, many Arab Muslims went through a major identity shift in which 
their identity went from a secular basis to a religious one; they began to identify 
themselves first as Muslims and then as Arabs. Muslim women who did not previously 
cover their hair began to veil, and Islam became a public, active lifestyle (Cainkar, 2002).  
By studying the experiences of Muslim university students, Peek (2005) develops 
a model of religious identity development. In many cases, especially for children, religion 
begins as an ascribed identity. In this stage, religion is usually not a salient identity. In the 
second stage, when religion becomes a chosen identity, the self-identification as a 
Muslim takes a central role, often overriding other core identities such as ethnicity and 
nationality. When religion becomes a declared identity in the third stage, which often 
occurred after the attacks of 9/11, Muslim students recognized the need to assert their 
religious identities in order to combat widespread misunderstandings. While not all 
religious groups, and not all Muslims, develop identities in this manner, it is helpful to 
acknowledge that religious identity is constructed and enacted. This notion is particularly 
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relevant to second-generation immigrants who often deal with multiple and at times 
incompatible or conflicting identities.  
Social Bias toward Muslim Women 
The history of Muslim exclusion helps us to fully comprehend the experiences of 
Muslim American women in the United States. In the previous section, I have discussed 
this history of exclusion and provided the theoretical groundwork needed to analyze the 
process of “othering” for Muslim Americans. It became clear to me when conducting this 
research that the experiences of Muslim men and women must indeed be substantially 
different. For instance, in terms of identity formation, Muslim women who chose to veil 
are not allowed the opportunity to claim whiteness as many Muslim men were able to.  I 
assume, although future research is needed in this area, that when one sees a woman 
wearing a traditional veil she is immediately “othered,” regardless of race. This notion 
would also be present in the stereotypical media portrayals of veiled Muslim women, in 
which Americans are led to believe that the hijab is symbol of oppression (Bartkowski 
and Read, 2000). In this next section, I will focus specifically on the experiences of 
Muslim women who veil.  
The Islamic veil. It is nearly impossible to come across literature that addresses 
Muslim women without also discussing the veil.  The Islamic veil can take numerous 
forms. In this research I will focus on two. The hijab is a veil that covers the head and 
chest. Another type of veil, the niqab, covers the head, chest and face, leaving only an 
opening for the eyes. In the existing literature it is common for the authors to address the 
widely disputed meanings that exist between the veil and Islam. Traditional Muslims take 
a pro-veiling stance and largely believe that the veil protects a woman’s chastity. It is also 
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a symbol of a Muslim woman’s obedience to Islamic principles. Many feminists 
challenge the more traditional interpretations of the Qur’an and suggest that the veil is a 
form of censorship and punishment for Muslim women.   Feminists often associate the 
veil with submission and marginality. They cite Qur’an verses that promote gender 
equality (Read and Bartkowski, 2000; Bartkowski and Read, 2003). Overall, the meaning 
of the veil is highly contested site of gender controversy between traditionalists and 
feminists.  
The Importance of the Veil in Defining Community. The veil is an important 
identity marker for Muslim women. In fact, many Muslim women living in the United 
States “come to rely on Islamic women’s friendship networks that form around the veil” 
(Bartkowski and Read, 2003, p. 80). For many, the veil serves the purpose of unification 
by providing the basis for a shared sense of community. When a woman wears a veil, it is 
an easily recognizable indicator that she is different from other American women; she is 
Muslim. This allows for a certain level of cultural comfort. When a woman wears the 
veil, other Muslim women are able to immediately begin communicating in Arabic 
(Bartkowski and Read, 2003).   
 While the veil may symbolize community for Muslim women, especially those 
living in a Western society, where the veil is not common, many American women resist 
traditionalism and choose not to wear a veil. This notion is apparent in qualitative 
interviews conducted by Bartkowski and Read (2003), in which respondents indicated 
that the sense of community for Muslim American women goes beyond the veil. “Many 
veiled women empathized with their sisters who opt against wearing the veil” (p. 84). 
When asked about the devoutness of Muslim women who do not wear a veil, hijab-
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wearers were quick to defend unveiled Muslims, claiming that religious beliefs were as 
important as religious practice. In the other direction, some unveiled Muslim women 
expressed acceptance and understanding for Muslim women who wear the hijab; actually, 
many Muslim women who do not currently veil, did at one point in their lives. A quote 
from one interview respondent, Amma, perhaps best sums up this sense of community 
among hijab-wearers and unveiled Muslim women alike. She said, “Muslim society 
doesn’t exist on the veil. Without the veil you would still be Muslim” (p. 84).  
The Veil as a Definition of Cultural Identity. Clothing and dress is one way in 
which information, and sometimes misinformation, is communicated. This nonverbal 
communication, which often comes before any sort of verbal exchange can give off signs 
regarding a person’s age, sex, and socioeconomic status. The veil reflects the wearer’s 
religious and cultural preferences. When an American Muslim woman chooses to wear a 
veil, it indicates to others that she is a follower of Islam and is not fully assimilated to 
Western society (Lurie, 1981). 
While it is largely accepted that the veil holds multiple meanings, most Muslim 
women agreed that ultimately that wearing the veil is a way to achieve full public 
participation in the United States. Many Muslim American women feel conflicted by the 
contradictory traditional Islamic and modern U.S. values and by wearing the veil they are 
able to embrace both American and Muslim identities simultaneously. Williams and 
Vashi (2007) suggest that the veil acts as a cultural resource that embodies the voluntary 
nature of religion in the US. The veil becomes a symbol for autonomy and equality. 
Basically, the veil is a cultural assertion of identity (Ajrouch, 2007).  Furthermore, the 
veil is a woman’s assertion that she is an active participant of a particular social group. 
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Women whose Muslim identity is particularly salient may be more inclined to express 
this identity through dress, or wearing a veil (Reece, 1996).  
 In multiple articles (Arjouch, 2007, Williams & Vashi, 2007, Keddie, 1990) it 
was noted that the veil is especially significant for the identities of college students. For 
college students, the veil may reflect the more active roles of women in the Islamist 
movements.  Many young, educated Muslim women are embracing Islam and are 
dedicated to studying the Qur’an in order to find passages that justify their arguments for 
equality between men and women. In this situation, the veil can be interpreted as a badge 
that signifies the respectability of the woman it covers (Reece, 1996). As discussed 
above, many Muslim women college students may see the veil as means to bridge the gap 
between traditional Islam and U.S. values (Ajrouch, 2007). 
Immigration and Status in the United States. When considering the 
experiences of Muslim American women it is important to account for immigrant status. 
Numerous studies find that the experiences of Muslim women in the United States are 
unique from those that live in other countries (see Arjouch, 2007 and Robinson, 2010). 
Ajrouch and Kusow (2007) suggest that it is necessary to consider immigrant status since 
one’s status in their country of origin, in addition to the systems of stratification in the 
US, work together to create various integration outcomes. For instance, while religion 
may be a salient status marker in the country of origin (e.g., Lebanese and Somali 
Muslims), the combination of religion and race may form the most prominent identities 
when in the United States. Specifically, while Somali immigrants were classified as 
black, they utilized their unique religious status to differentiate themselves from other 
black minority groups. In this case, religion became the most salient identity, and Muslim 
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women were more likely to wear the hijab in the Western world than they were in 
Somalia. On the other hand, since Lebanese Muslims were classified as white, they used 
this privileged status to create a more mainstream Islamic identity. 
Inspiration for the Study Design 
This current research builds on a study conducted by El-Geledi and Bourhis 
(2012). In this previous research, El-Geledi and Bourhis examined the impact of the 
Islamic veil on ethnic attitudes and acculturation orientations toward Muslims for Quebec 
Francophone students. Using a web-based experiment, the researchers used computer-
generated images of a woman so that that same woman was shown wearing traditional 
western clothing, a Catholic nun’s habit, a hijab, or a niqab. Participants were asked to 
give their first impression of the woman and respond to a series of attitudinal questions. 
Results indicated that respondents had the least favorable attitudes toward the woman 
wearing the niqab followed by the woman wearing the hijab. Respondents expressed the 
most favorable attitudes toward the woman wearing western clothing. While I 
appreciated the overall design of this study, I found it problematic that the woman in all 
of the pictures was clearly European American looking (e.g., light skin and light hair). By 
using both light skinned and dark skinned targets, my research expands on this previous 
research by including a dimension of skin color.  
Theoretical Framework 
 This research examines the roles of religion, race and the intersections of race and 
religion to explore social bias toward Muslim women who wear various forms of veil. As 
previously discussed, Muslim women who veil represent a unique social group. A goal of 
this research is to develop a deeper understanding of the source or sources of bias toward 
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Muslim women who veil. Does the bias stem from religion? Race? A combination of 
both? Something else? The following theoretical frameworks informed my research 
hypotheses, which I propose in the next section.  
Social Identity Theory. The process of “othering” for Muslim women who veil 
may be understood by using social identity theory. Social identity theory situates 
interactions along a continuum from interpersonal to intergroup. One’s social identity is 
derived from one’s group membership (Tajfel, 1982). As discussed above, the veil allows 
women to express their Muslim identity. Social identity theory supposes that because 
Muslims’ are religiously, culturally, and ethnically different from mainstream Judeo-
Christianity, Americans are less likely to trust and tolerate them, which results in viewing 
them as an “out-group.” Thus, since Muslims have always existed outside of mainstream 
American society, it makes sense that they have faced exclusion and discrimination both 
before and after 9/11. In terms of the process of “othering,” Kalkan et al. (2009) suggest 
that Americans may differentiate between two “bands of others,” one based on racial and 
religious minority groups and the other based on cultural minorities. The authors propose 
that Muslims are linked to both bands, but find evidence that Americans’ attitudes toward 
Muslims seem to be more closely tied to cultural outgroups (e.g., gays and illegal 
immigrants), as opposed to racial and religious minorities (e.g., African Americans and 
Jews). This is an important distinction since views toward cultural minorities are often 
more difficult to change.  
Social Boundaries. This historical and present-day exclusion of Muslim and 
Arab Americans and the increases in anti-Muslim violence post-9/11 may reflect the 
notions of symbolic boundaries as proposed by Lamont and Molnár (2002). To fully 
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understand this religious boundary creation and maintenance in terms of Americans’ 
attitudes, it is necessary to look at the role of religion in the United States. It has been 
well-documented (see Tocqueville, 1992) that Christianity has played in integral role in 
America’s history. Along similar lines, Robert Bellah (1985, 1991) emphasizes the 
importance of Judeo-Christian religions in personal identity formation and civic 
engagement. The religious convergence that occurred in the 20th century helps to explain 
the concept that religion, not necessarily Christianity, is the basis for trust in American 
society. In general, Americans have more trust in those that are religious. It has also been 
suggested that an increase in religious pluralism, largely due to immigration and 
globalization, has resulted in greater religious tolerance (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartman, 
2006). While this may be the case for Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, the greater 
acceptance of religious diversity does not appear to extend to Muslims.  
Lamont and Molnár (2002) define symbolic boundaries as “conceptual 
distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time 
and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to 
agree upon definitions of reality…Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups 
and generate feelings of similarity and group membership” (p. 168). When widely agreed 
upon, symbolic boundaries can become social boundaries, or “objectified forms of social 
differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal distribution of resources (material 
and nonmaterial) and social opportunities” (p. 168). In their paper, Lamont and Molnár 
discuss the relationship between symbolic and social boundaries and determine that 
symbolic boundaries are frequently used to enforce and maintain social boundaries, while 
simultaneously contesting and reframing their meanings. When considering American’s 
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attitudes toward Muslim Americans it is apparent that symbolic boundaries, which may 
have initially formed based on immigration status or religious differences, have indeed 
potentially become so salient that they have resulted in social boundaries. Since Muslims 
are both viewed as an “out-group” in contemporary American society and put at a 
distance by symbolic and social boundaries, I hypothesize that participants will express 
more social bias toward targets wearing a veil than targets with no veil. 
Intersectionality. While it is important to consider both religion and race, as 
derived from skin tone, when examining social bias toward Muslim women, it is also 
important to consider the intersection of race and religion. Kimberly Crenshaw (1989), 
who coined the term intersectionality, recognized the need to examine how both race and 
gender interact to create the multiple dimensions of Black women’s employment 
experiences. Intersectionality, as feminist Patricia Hill Collins (1999) describes it, refers 
to the “interlocking systems of race, class and gender,” which constitute a “matrix of 
oppression.” Theories of intersectionality suppose that inequality cannot be understood 
unidimensionally and must be examined through an intersectional lens (Browne & Misra, 
2003). For example, it is not appropriate to simply state that men oppress women in the 
economic realm. By lumping all men all women together, the complexities of the labor 
market are overlooked. For instance, in some cases white women have higher incomes 
than Black, Mexican and Puerto-Rican men (Browne, 1999; McCall, 2000). 
Approaches of intersectionality can move beyond race, class and gender, and the 
matrix of oppression might also include dimensions of age, ability, and sexuality (Weber, 
2001). Religion, nationality, native language, immigrant status among other aspects could 
also be incorporated into an intersectional perspective. Overall, these dimensions occur 
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simultaneously and the intersections should be examined whenever possible. Therefore, 
with the use of a factorial design, I have included a study of the intersections of race and 
religion in this study by utilizing six experimental conditions that vary in terms of skin 
tone and veil coverage. Research conducted for the American Mosaic Project finds that 
religious minorities such as Atheists, Buddhists, and Mormons have higher rates of 
distrust than racial and ethnic minorities such as Asian American, African Americans and 
Hispanics/Latinos (“Boundaries in the American Mosaic,” 2014). Since these findings 
suggest that racialized distrust is relatively low compared to other groups like religious 
outsiders, I hypothesize that religion (as derived from veil coverage) will carry more 
weight than race (as derived from skin tone). The intersection of race and religion is 
further informed by colorism, Islamophobia and belief in secularism.  
Skin tone preference. Even if religion may carry more weight than race, the 
notion of colorism supposes that light skinned people experience social advantages over 
dark skinned people. Colorism, or skin tone stratification, is a process that privileges light 
skinned people over dark skinned people in areas such as education, income, and 
housing. In this process, light-skinned people experience clear societal advantages even 
when controlling for other background variables (Hughes & Hertel, 1990; Kieth & 
Herring, 1991).  Racial discrimination is a structural issue that is based on two levels: 
race and skin color. Although all racial minorities experience discrimination based on 
their racial category, the intensity of the discrimination is dependent on skin tone. For 
instance, light skinned African Americans may have a higher income than dark skinned 
African Americans, but both earn less than whites. While race is a social concept, 
colorism is specifically concerned with actual skin tone, as opposed to a racial or ethnic 
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identity. Colorism is a reflection of the larger system of racism in the United States and 
worldwide (Hunter, 2007).  
Colorism is practiced both by whites and people of color. For example, research 
has found that many racial minorities will choose to marry a light skinned woman as 
opposed to a dark skinned woman (Hunter, 1998; Udry Baumann, & Chase, 1971). In 
addition, research on children has found that both white and non-white children hold pro-
white biases (Averhart & Bigler, 1997; Stokes-Guinan, 2011). This preference for light 
skin is deeply ingrained in our contemporary American culture. An analysis of the 
popular media, such as the work of Jean Kilbourne (1999), reveals the notion of a beauty 
ideal, in which the standards are light skin and Anglo features. Based on this research, I 
hypothesize that participants will express less social bias toward light skinned targets 
than dark skinned targets. 
Islamophobia.  Islamophobia is the fear of Muslims and the Islamic faith (Lee, 
Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009). As outlined in the previous sections, Muslims 
have always been excluded from American society, but since the attacks of 9/11, social 
bias toward Muslims has reached an all-time high.  Even though only a small portion of 
Muslims are responsible for acts of terrorism, many Americans view Islam and Muslims 
as irrational, backward, and dangerous (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008). The Islamic veil, 
as a symbol of Islam, has been found to trigger negative reactions. The veil may be 
viewed as a threat to equal rights achieved by feminist movements, a political symbol of 
the rising power of religious fundamentalism or the refusal of Muslim women to 
assimilate with mainstream society (El-Geledi & Bourhis, 2012). Since the niqab is a 
more extreme version of the veil than the hijab, Muslim women who wear the niqab may 
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face even more bias than those who wear the hijab. Based on the findings of El-Geledi & 
Bourhis, I hypothesize that participants will express the most social bias toward the 
targets wearing the niqab, followed by targets wearing the hijab, relative to targets with 
no veil.  
Islamophobia has been measured in numerous ways. Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & 
Timani (2009) measured Islamophobia with the Islamophobia Scale, which they describe 
as “a self-report measure of an individual’s fear-related attitudes toward Muslims and the 
religion of Islam” (p. 157). The Islamophobia Scale includes two factors, Islamophobia – 
AB and Islamophobia – CG. Lee et al. (2013) found that the Islamophobia Scale is 
reliable across time and is most sound as a two-factor model.  
Using a confirmatory factor analysis, Lee et al. (2013) found that the 
Islamophobia scale is best represented by two, positively correlated factors. The first 
eight items of the scale reflect the affective-behavioral component of Islamophobia, 
including items that focus on avoidance-related emotions and behaviors toward Muslims 
(i.e. “If I could, I would live in a place where there are no Muslims”). The second eight 
items of the scale reflect the cognitive component of Islamophobia, including items that 
focus on the belief that Muslims and Islam are dangerous (i.e. “Islam supports terrorist 
acts”).  
Another measure is Islamoprejudice, which was measured using items from the 
short version of the Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (SIPSCI) 
developed by Imhoff and Recker (2012). Imhoff and Recker (2012) make the important 
distinction between prejudice toward Muslims and secular critique of Muslim practices. 
They found that measures of Islamoprejudice and measures of the secular critique of 
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Islam were mostly independent of each other, which indicates the necessity to look at 
both areas when researching attitudes toward Islam (Irmhoff & Recker, 2012). Since 
there is not a definitive measure of Islamophobia, I used all three measures in this 
research to determine which measure is best at measuring social bias toward Muslim 
women who veil. 
Secularism. Previous research has found that Islamophobia can result from both 
prejudiced views toward Muslims and a secular critique of religious practices (Irmhoff & 
Recker, 2012). Some researchers suggest that an attempt to understand bias in terms of 
Islamophobia does not capture genuine and rational critiques of religious traditions, 
habits and regimes (Irmhoff & Recker, 2012; Halliday, 1999; Malik, 2005). For instance, 
those with strong secular beliefs may critique religious practices such as veiling, 
circumcision and the ritual slaughtering of animals, not necessarily because they are non-
Christian, but because they reflect cultures that support extreme submission to religion 
and therefore do not allow individuals to hold secularist values (Ozyurek, 2005).  
Since Imhoff and Recker (2012) found that it was important to differentiate 
between prejudice toward Muslims and secular critique of Muslim practices, I used two 
measures of secularism in this study. First, I used the Secular Critique of Islam subscale 
as designed by Irmhoff and Recker (2012). This subscale was designed to measure the 
secular critique of Islam and included items that touch on the separation of church and 
state, gender relations, universalist values and fundamentalism. Second, a more general 
belief in secularism was measured using questions developed by Francis and Greer 
(1992) and with several original items developed by the author of this research.  
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Hypotheses 
In this research, social bias is measured in numerous ways. I use questions 
designed to measure attraction, similarity, social distance, moral outrage and stereotypes 
to capture social bias. Lower ratings on the attraction items, similarity items and the 
stereotypes (warmth, social status and competence) reflect higher social bias. Higher 
ratings on the social distance, moral outrage and the competition stereotype items reflect 
higher social bias. I also included attitudinal measures of Islamophobia and secularism to 
further explore social bias toward Muslim women who veil. 
 Based on the literature review and theory described above, my research 
hypotheses are: 
1. As veil coverage increases, social bias toward the target will increase. 
2. Participants will express higher levels of social bias toward dark skinned 
targets than light skinned targets. 
3. Veil coverage will have a greater impact on social bias than skin tone.  
4. In the case of interaction effects, veiling will have a greater impact on 
social bias for dark relative to light skinned targets. 
5. Islamophobia and Secularism will moderate the impact of veil coverage on 
social bias. Veiling will be associated with more social bias among those 
with higher (versus lower) levels of Islamophobia and Secularism.   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
 
 In Chapter Two I outlined the significance of the study of social bias, specifically 
in terms of Muslim women. I have also outlined a theoretical framework for this research 
and proposed hypotheses. As mentioned, Muslim women, especially those who veil, 
represent a unique social group. As minorities in terms of race, religion, sex, country of 
origin, etc., it is my goal to determine the ultimate source of bias. In this chapter I will 
discuss the methods, procedures and data analyses utilized to test the hypotheses outlined 
in the previous chapter. First, I will begin by discussing participants. Next, I will describe 
the process of selecting participants and the administration of the survey instrument. 
Third, I will provide a description of the measures used in the experiment. Finally, I will 
outline the experimental and statistical tests used to analyze the data.   
Participants 
 Participants for this study came from sociology and criminal justice classes at 
Iowa State University in the spring of 2014. The classes contacted for participants 
included: Introduction to Sociology, Youth and Crime, Deviant and Criminal Behavior, 
Sociology of Intimate Relationships, Social Problems and American Values, Social 
Psychology: A Sociological Perspective, and Sex and Gender in Society. The overall 
participation rate was 29.92% (395/1320), however I ended up with 352 participants 
(26.74% participation rate) with usable data. Since some participants did not fill out the 
demographic section of the survey, and I include participant sex as a variable in my 
analyses, I was unable to use some of the responses. Out of the respondents whose data 
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was not used: ten were in the light skin, no veil condition; ten were in the light skin, hijab 
condition, three were in the light skin, niqab condition; ten were in the dark skin, no veil 
condition, two were in the dark skin, hijab condition, and seven were in the dark skin, 
niqab condition.  In addition, not all respondents completed all questions, so some 
dependent variables have fewer than 353 responses. 
My participation rate is higher than rates found in previous research. When 
looking at web surveys, without incentives, Sax, Gilmartin, and Bryant (2003) found that 
response rates to Your First College Year (YFCY), a national survey of first-year college 
students, was 19.8 percent. They found that response rates to web surveys, with 
incentives, was 17.1 percent (p. 417). Participation rates varied by class and were largely 
dependent on the instructor’s offering of extra credit; classes in which extra credit was 
offered for survey participation had the highest participation rates. Overall, the sample is 
one of convenience and results should not be taken to represent the Iowa State University 
student population as a whole.  
Participant Characteristics. The majority of participants in the sample were 
women. Sixty-four percent were female (n = 224) and 36.36 percent were male (n = 128). 
The average age was 20.63 years old. Sample participants represented all class years: 
25.28 % (n = 89) were first years, 20.74% (n = 73) were sophomores, 26.99% (n = 95) 
were juniors, 26.42% (n = 93) were seniors, and 0.57% (n = 2) classified as other.  
The students in the sample came from a wide variety of majors. Criminal Justice 
was the most popular major (17.33%, n = 61) followed closely by Psychology (16.48%, n 
= 58). Other popular majors included Liberal Arts (10.80%, n = 38) and Sociology 
(8.24%, n = 29).  Overall, out of the 350 respondents, 64.29% (n = 225) were from the 
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College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. It is important to consider the majors of the 
participants when analyzing the results since students studying criminal justice, 
psychology and sociology may be aware of items and concepts in the study, which may 
influence the results. If students were familiar with the measures, they may have 
responded in socially desirable ways.  
The majority of the sample were not of Hispanic or Latino/a ethnicity (91.19%, n 
= 321) and classified as white for race (84.66%, n = 298). While respondents reported 
many religions, the majority of students in the sample were predominantly Christian. The 
largest group of participants classified as Christian - Catholic (25.57%, n = 90). The 
second most popular religion was Christian - Other (21.88%, n = 77) followed by 
Unaffiliated – Agnostic (17.61%, n = 62). (See Table 3.) 
Table 3 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 
Characteristic N Percent 
Age (years) (N = 352)   
18 34 9.66 
19 84 23.86 
20 79 22.44 
21 72 20.45 
22 46 13.07 
23 10 2.84 
24 12 3.41 
25 5 1.42 
26 1 0.28 
27 3 0.85 
28 1 0.28 
29 1 0.28 
35 3 0.85 
39 1 0.28 
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Table 3 continued
Sex (N = 352)   
Female 224 63.64 
Male 128 36.36 
Class Year (N = 352)   
First Year 89 25.28 
Sophomore 73 20.74 
Junior 95 26.99 
Senior 93 26.42 
Other 2 0.57 
Major (N = 352)   
Bio. Or Life Sciences 26 7.39 
Business 19 5.40 
Communications 9 2.56 
Computer & Info. Sciences 2 0.57 
Crim. Justice 61 17.33 
Education 11 3.13 
Engineering 15 4.26 
Family Studies 7 1.99 
Health Prof. or Related Sciences 26 7.39 
Humanities 4 1.14 
Liberal Arts 38 10.80 
Mathematics 3 0.85 
Physical Sciences 5 1.42 
Psychology 58 16.48 
Sociology 29 8.24 
Other Soc. Sciences/History 3 0.85 
Visual or Performing Arts 2 0.57 
Other 34 9.66 
College (N = 350)   
Ag. & Life Sciences 29 8.29 
Business 18 5.14 
Design 8 2.29 
Engineering 13 3.71 
Human Sciences 51 14.57 
Liberal Arts & Sciences 225 64.29 
Other 6 1.71 
Ethnicity (N = 352)   
Hispanic or Latino 21 5.97 
Not Hispanic or Latino 321 91.19 
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Table 3 continued
Unknown 10 2.84 
Race (N = 352)   
American Indian/Alaska Native 4 1.14 
East Asian 3 0.85 
South Asian 4 1.14 
Black or African American 17 4.83 
White 298 84.66 
More than one race: Black/White 7 1.99 
More than one race: Other 10 2.84 
Other or Unknown 9 2.56 
Religious Affiliation (N = 352)   
Christian  - Protestant – Mainline Church 34 9.66 
Christian – Protestant – Evangelical Church 35 9.94 
Christian Protestant – Historical Black 5 1.42 
Christian – Catholic 90 25.57 
Christian – Jehovah’s Witness 1 0.28 
Christian – Other 77 21.88 
Buddhist – Other 1 0.28 
New Age 1 0.28 
Unaffiliated – Athiest 30 8.52 
Unaffiliated – Agnostic 62 17.61 
Any other religion not listed above 16 4.55 
Note: Respondents who identified as Muslim (n = 2) and international students (n = 9) 
were removed from the study. 
 
Contacting Students. Prior to conducting the study, I got approval for human 
subject research through the Iowa State University Institutional Review Board. To obtain 
student email addresses, I contacted Iowa State University sociology and criminal justice 
professors teaching during the spring 2014 semester. Those that agreed to let their 
students participate in the study provided me with class lists. Some of the professors 
offered extra credit for students that completed the study. In addition to the initial 
invitation, which was sent on April 28, 2014, reminder emails were sent to non-
respondents four, eight, and eleven days after the study opened. Overall, the study ran for 
seventeen days and closed on May 14, 2014.  
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The Experiment 
Using a 2 (skin tone) X 3 (veil coverage) between-subjects experimental design, 
participants were shown a female face, and asked to answer a number of survey items. 
There were six experimental conditions. Survey measures and questions were exactly the 
same in each condition, but the image that participants responded to was different. There 
were six images that varied in terms of skin color and type of head covering. There were 
two skin tone conditions: light skin and dark skin. There were three head covering 
conditions: no veil, hijab and niqab. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
six conditions.  
The experiment was conducted though a web survey utilizing Qualtrics survey 
software. Participants were emailed an invitation to participate (see Appendix A), which 
included a survey link. The survey consisted of five sections and twenty-six screen pages. 
The first section was a description of the study and informed consent. Since the study was 
conducted entirely over the web, in lieu of signatures on the informed consent document 
(See Appendix B), participants were informed that “By clicking ‘Next’ below you are 
indicating that you are at least 18 years of age, that you voluntarily agree to participate in 
this study, that the study has been explained to you, and that you have been given the 
time to read the document and that your questions have been satisfactorily answered.” 
Participants were also given the option to print the consent document for their records.  
Since the study of social bias has the potential to bring about socially desirable 
responses (Schwarz, 2008), it was important that participants were unaware that the true 
purpose of the study was to measure bias toward Muslim women who veil. Therefore, in 
the study description, I described the survey as simply as one of person perception; the 
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purpose was to gain a better understanding of how we perceive others. Participants were 
told that they would view a series of faces and asked to respond to a series of questions 
regarding their attitudes toward the people in the images. After consenting to participate, 
participants viewed a collage of various faces (See Appendix C) and the prompt, “In this 
section, you will be shown one of these faces and asked to rate the person based on his or 
her appearance. When you click next you will be randomly assigned a face.” At this 
point, participants were not aware of the true purpose of the study and did not know the 
factors being tested.  
In the second section of the survey, participants were shown a target face and 
responded to a series of questions designed to measure social bias. The questions 
addressed: attraction, similarity, social distance, moral outrage and stereotypes. The 
questions were arranged on eight screens and the target face was at the top of each page. 
The following section will further discuss these measures. 
The third section of the survey was designed to measure beliefs about religion and 
secularism. It began with a screen much like the first section. Participants viewed a 
collage of religious symbols (See Appendix D) and the prompt, “The next set of 
questions are about religion. When you click next, you will be randomly assigned to 
answer questions about one of these religions.” Again, participants were deceived to 
think that they would be randomly assigned a religion, but in reality all participants 
answered the same questions about Islam. Questions in this section measured 
Islamophobia, utilizing both cognitive and affective-behavioral measures, and secular 
critiques of Islam. The section also included a series of questions designed to measure the 
participant’s views on secularism.  
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The fourth section included a series of demographic questions. Respondents were 
asked to report their: sex, age, class year, ethnicity, race, religious affiliation, and 
political identity. Participants were also asked if they were international students and 
what college and major they were in. For purposes of this study, international students (n 
= 9) and those that identified as Muslim (n = 2) were removed.  International students 
were removed because I wanted to focus specifically on Americans’ attitudes toward 
Muslim women. With the continual significance of 9/11, Muslims continue to be one of 
the most “othered” minority groups in contemporary American society (Edgall & Gerteis, 
2006). Furthermore, Muslims were removed since the aim of the research was to study 
out-group rather than in-group bias. 
The final section included a document that informed participants of the true 
purpose to the study – to measure social bias toward Muslim women who veil (See 
Appendix E). It also restated that all survey results will be kept strictly confidential. At 
the end of the document, participants were given the option to remove their data from the 
survey, now that they were aware of the full purpose of the research. Only four 
participants wanted their data removed. This suggests that the deception was not a big 
issue for that sample. Finally, after debriefing participants were asked if they were aware 
of the true purpose of the study. Just over fifty-one percent (51.83 %, n = 170) of 
participants reported that they were aware of the true purpose of the study. This is 
important to keep in mind when interpreting the results. Since over half of the 
participants reported that they were aware of the true purpose of the study, the results 
may reflect socially desirable responses.  
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Measures 
 As addressed in the previous section, the study consisted of six experimental 
conditions. Using a 2 (skin tone) X 3 (veil coverage) between-subjects factorial design, 
the six conditions consisted of two skin tone variations and three head covering 
variations. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six target female faces: light 
skin with no veil, light skin with hijab, light skin with niqab, dark skin with no veil, dark 
skin with hijab, and dark skin with niqab. To ensure that there was no confusion, 
participants viewed their randomly assigned target face at the top of every page of 
questions. Therefore, there was no need to test participants’ memory of the image. 
Target Face. The image of the woman was taken from Project Implicit 
(http://www.projectimplicit. net/stimuli.html). This website, which is a multi-university 
research collaborations contains links to Implicit Association Tests (IAT) as well as 
materials and tools for researchers. One section of the website contains stimulus materials 
for social and behavioral research. Here, researchers are able to access images used in 
many IATs. The target face used in this research came from the light skin and dark skin 
IAT. The particular woman’s image was selected because of her hairstyle, which did not 
have any hair on her face. This was necessary because the image of the women was 
photoshopped to wear a hijab and niqab, which cover the hair. In addition, the woman’s 
skin was photoshopped to have light or dark skin tones (See Figure 3). For the 
introductory collage of faces, I used stimulus images from the Asian/white faces, 
Native/white faces and light skin and dark skin IATs.  
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Light skin X no veil  Light skin X hijab  Light skin X niqab 
 
Dark skin X no veil  Dark skin X hijab  Dark skin X niqab 
 
Figure 3. Target faces. 
 
Attraction. Attraction was measured using items from Moreland and Beach 
(1992). These items were selected to be used in this research because they had previously 
been used by Moreland and Beach to test the reactions of college students to photos of 
female target faces. Furthermore, the measures, which in addition to assessments of 
personality characteristics, include questions about friendship, spending time together, 
and working on projects, are relevant to college-age students.  
Following Moreland and Beach, attraction was measured with three single items 
and a 10-item semantic differential scale.  Participants were shown their target face and 
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given the prompt “Imagine meeting this woman and learning more about her. Estimate 
the probability that you would…”  
Attraction 1: “like her and become friends with her.”  
Attraction 2: “enjoy spending time with her.”  
Attraction 3: “work with her on some project of mutual interest.”  
These three attraction items were measured with eleven-point scales ranging from zero to 
one hundred percent probability. The three separate attraction measures were highly 
correlated, as expected (α = .91).  
 Next, participants were asked to rate the target on ten personality dimensions: 
interesting – boring, unattractive – attractive, unselfish – selfish, unpopular – popular, 
unconceited – conceited, unintelligent – intelligent, warm – cold, unsuccessful – 
successful, honest – dishonest, insincere – sincere. The bipolar adjectives were separated 
by a seven-point response scale. For purposes of scoring, the items were reverse-coded, if 
applicable, and then averaged to produce a single measure of attraction. Attraction index 
scores ranged from 2.5 to 7 (M = 4.40, SD = 0.69); higher scores indicated greater 
attraction. The ten Attraction Index items were also highly correlated (α = .73). 
Similarity. As with attraction, similarity was measured with three separate 
similarity measures and a similarity index. Again, measures were taken from Moreland 
and Beach (1992). As previously stated, these measures were selected because they were 
effective in previous research and applicable to college students. For the three separate 
similarity measures, respondents were shown the target face and given the prompt 
“Imagine meeting this woman and learning more about her. Estimate the probability 
that…”  
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Similarity 1:  “she would turn out to come from the same social background as 
myself.” 
Similarity 2: “I would be able to understand her personality fairly well.” 
Similarity 3:  “I would discover that her plans for the future are similar to my 
own.” 
As with the attraction measures, participants responded to an eleven-point scale that 
ranged from zero percent to one hundred percent, with ten percent intervals. The three 
separate measures of similarity were highly correlated (α = .78).  
 For the Similarity Index, participants were shown the target face and given the 
prompt: “Compare yourself with this woman. For each trait, rate whether it is stronger in 
your personality or stronger in hers.” Participants rated the target on the following 
personality characteristics: interestingness, attractiveness, selfishness, popularity, 
conceitedness, intelligence, warmth, successfulness, honesty, and sincerity. Using a 
seven-point scale, participants rated the personality characteristics from “1 = stronger in 
my personality” to “7 = stronger in her personality.” The mid-point was “4 = about the 
same in both our personalities.” For scoring, responses were then folded around the mid-
point and averaged to create a single similarity measure which ranged from zero to three 
(M = 2.19, SD = 0.62); higher scores represent greater similarity. In other words, a 
response value of 4 was recoded to 3 (maximum similarity); a response value of 5 or 3 
was recoded to 2; a response value of 6 or 2 was recoded to 1; and a response value of 7 
or 1 was recoded to 0 (maximum dissimilarity). The items comprising the Similarity 
Index were highly correlated (α = .85). 
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Social Distance. Social distance was measured using a revised social distance 
scale (Kleg & Yamamoto, 1998). Participants viewed the target face and the prompt 
“Social distance means the degree that individuals desire to associate with others. Please 
select that highest degree of association you would desire to have with someone like her. 
Give your first reaction. ” Based on the original Bogardus social distance scale, 
participants selected one of seven possible distances: to keep out of my country, to have 
as a visitor to my country, to have as a speaking acquaintance only, to work in the same 
office, to have as next-door neighbor, to have as best friend, or to marry into my family. 
Responses were scored from one to seven (M = 3.61, SD = 1.37), with higher values 
reflecting greater social distance. In other words, “marry into my family” was assigned a 
value of one and “keep out of my country” was assigned a value of seven.  
Moral Outrage. Moral outrage was measured using items adapted from Tetlock, 
Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000). As Tetlock et al. (2000) explain, moral outrage 
is a composite psychological state that subsumes cognitive aspects, such as harsh 
character attributions to those who endorse normative transgressions; affective aspects, 
such as anger toward those who endorse deviant thoughts; and behavioral reactions such 
as support for punishing deviant thinkers, and is one of the most empathic ways to 
distance oneself from normative transgressions. Since morality is frequently linked with 
religion (Bloom, 2012) and social bias results in affective, behavioral and cognitive 
responses, I deemed these measures appropriate to use in the current study.  
 Participants were shown their target face and given the prompt: “Please indicate 
your reaction to members of this group.” The moral outrage items included nine 
judgments, which were measured on a 7-point scale, with anchors at one and seven: 
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should be banned – should be permitted, highly moral – highly immoral, highly upsetting 
– not at all upsetting, not at all sad – extremely sad, not at all tragic – tragic, not at all 
offensive – highly offensive, no anger – great deal of anger, very irrational – very 
rational, completely crazy – completely sane. For purposes of scoring, items were reverse 
coded, if necessary, and scores were averaged to create a Moral Outrage Index. Scores on 
the Moral Outrage Index ranged from 2.85 to 5.15 (M = 3.52, SD = 0.50). The nine items 
that comprised the index were highly correlated (α = .92). 
Stereotypes. Stereotypes were measured using items from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick 
and Xu’s (2002) stereotype content model. As mentioned in Chapter 2, stereotyping is a 
cognitive response to social bias. Fiske et al. (2002) provide perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of stereotypes and argue that stereotypes are captured by two 
dimensions – warmth and competence. “Subjectively positive stereotypes on one 
dimension do not contradict prejudice but often are functionally consistent with 
unflattering stereotypes on the other dimension” (Fiske et al., 2002, p. 878). In addition, 
the authors identify two aspects of intergroup relations – relative status and competence 
in society, which predict the group’s standing on the two dimensions of stereotyping. 
Fiske et al. (2002) find that the combinations of perceived warmth and competence (low 
competence, low warmth; low competence, high warmth; high competence, low warmth; 
and high competence high warmth) result in different affective reactions: pity, envy, 
contempt, and admiration 
In this research, participants viewed the target face and the prompt, “Setting aside 
your personal beliefs, how do you think someone like her is viewed by others? As, 
viewed by society, how _________ is someone like her?” Using a five-point scale, 
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ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely, participants rated people like the target on 
the following personality characteristics: competent, confident, independent, competitive, 
intelligent, tolerant, warm, good-natured, and sincere. For purposes of scoring, responses 
to the first five items were averaged to create a competence index (α = .89) and scores 
from the last four items were average to create a warmth index (α = .91).  
 Next, while viewing the target face, participants were given the prompt, “We are 
not interested in your personal beliefs, but in how you think someone like her is viewed 
by others. As viewed by society _________.” Participants responded to: how prestigious 
are the jobs typically achieved by people like her; how economically successful have 
people like her been; how well educated are people like her; if people like her get special 
breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), this is likely to make things more difficult 
for people like me; the more power people like her have, the less power people like me 
are likely to have; and resources that go to people like her are likely to take away from 
the resources of people like me. The five-point response scale ranged from 1 = not at all 
to 5 = extremely. For scoring purposes, responses to the first three items were averaged to 
create a status index (α = .90) and responses to the final three items were averaged to 
create a competition index (α = .87). 
Islamophobia. Islamophobia was measured using the two factors, Islamophobia – 
AB and Islamophobia – CG, from the Islamophobia Scale developed by Lee, Reid, Short, 
Gibbons, Yeh and Campbell (2013). The first eight items of the scale reflect the 
affective-behavioral component of Islamophobia, including items that focus on 
avoidance-related emotions and behaviors toward Muslims (e.g., “If I could, I would live 
in a place where there are no Muslims”). The second eight items of the scale reflect the 
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cognitive component of Islamophobia, including items that focus on the belief that 
Muslims and Islam are dangerous (e.g., “Islam supports terrorist acts”) (For all items, see 
Appendix F). I used these scales in my study and participants responded to each of the 
statements using a five-point scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree. Responses to each factor’s eight items was then summed to create a single measure 
for the affective-behavioral factor (Islamophobia – AB) and the cognitive factor of 
Islamophobia (Islamophobia – CG). Islamophobia – AB scores ranged from 8 to 40 (M = 
15.09, SD = 6.79), and the eight items were highly correlated (α = .94). Islamophobia – 
CG scores ranged from 7 to 40 (M = 14.70, SD = 7.25), and the items were highly 
correlated (α = .97).  
Islamoprejudice was measured using items from the short version of the Scale for 
Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (SIPSCI) by Imhoff and Recker (2012). 
Irmhoff and Recker (2012) conducted two studies and in the second study created a short 
version of the Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (SIPSCI), which 
consisted of nine items designed to measure Islamoprejudice and six items designed to 
measure secular critique. The items were selected from the long version of the scale 
because there was high item-total correlation, a minimum of scale heterogeneity and a 
balance of positive are reverse-coded items (Irmhoff & Recker, 2012). I used the 
Islamoprejudice sub-scale as a measure of Islamophobia. Statements designed to measure 
Islamoprejudice included items that describe Islam as wrong, different, archaic, and 
irrational (For all items, see Appendix G). Respondents were asked to indicate their level 
of disagreement/agreement based on a five-point scale that ranged from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Following Irhmoff and Recker (2012), respondents’ scores 
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were averaged to create a single measure for Islamoprejudice. For my sample, 
Islamoprejudice scores ranged from 1.33 to 4.25 (M = 2.63, SD = 0.54), and the items 
were highly correlated (α = .70).  
Secularism. I used two measures of secularism in this study. First, I used the 
Secular Critique of Islam subscale as designed by Irmhoff and Recker (2012). This 
subscale was designed to measure the secular critique of Islam and included items that 
touch on the separation of church and state, gender relations, universalist values and 
fundamentalism (For all items, see Appendix G). Respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of disagreement/agreement based on a five-point scale that ranged from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Following Irhmoff and Recker (2012), 
respondents’ scores on each of the scales were averaged to create one measure the secular 
critique of Islam. Secular Critique of Islam values ranged from one to five (M = 3.46, SD 
= 0.62), and higher scores indicated a higher secular critique of Islam. The items were 
highly correlated (α = .75).  
Second, a general belief in secularism was measured using questions developed 
by Francis and Greer (1992) and with several original items developed by the author of 
this research. At the beginning of this section of the survey, participants were given the 
prompt “Secularism is the belief that religion should not play a role in government, 
education or other public parts of society. Please indicate the extent to which you 
disagree or agree with the following items about secularism.” Statements ranged from 
beliefs about the role of religion in society (i.e., “Religion has done more harm than good 
in the history of humankind,”) to the role of government (i.e., “The government should be 
independent of and hostile to religion of any kind”) (For all items, see Appendix H).  
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Participants responded to the statements using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. A single measure of secularism, the Secularism 
scale, was creating by averaging responses to the items. Secularism scale values ranged 
from one to five (M = 3.22, SD = 0.84), and the items were highly correlated (α = .91) 
Demographics. Participants responded to a series of demographic questions (See 
Appendix I). Participants were asked their age, sex, class year, major and college. They 
were also asked if they were an international student. Participants were asked to report 
their ethnicity, race, and religious affiliation. All demographic questions were forced-
choice responses to help with coding and analysis. The overall format of the demographic 
questions was modeled after the demographic section on the Implicit Association Test 
through Project Implicit (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/) because the response 
categories were complete and captured the information that was desired.  
(For a complete list and description of variables, see Appendix J. See Appendix K for a 
Correlation Table with all study variables.) 
Methods of Analysis 
 First, I cleaned and re-coded the data, when necessary. Then, I created indexes 
and scales, as described in the sections above. Third, I computed descriptive statistics for 
each of the study variables. Fourth, I conducted ANCOVA tests to determine the 
relationships between variables. I conducted fully-crossed three-way ANCOVAS (skin 
tone, veil, participant sex) on each of the fourteen dependent variables (See Appendix J). 
Next, I included measures of Islamophobia as covariates and conducted ANCOVAs on 
each of the fourteen dependent variables. I also conducted ANCOVAs with measures of 
secularism as covariates. In Chapter Four, I will discuss the results of the analyses.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 In this chapter I will discuss the results of the analyses of variance and 
covariance. First, I conducted three-way, fully-crossed ANCOVAs to examine the main 
effects of skin tone, veil, and participant sex, and the interaction effects for these 
variables: skin tone X veil, skin tone X sex, veil X sex, and skin tone X veil X sex. When 
interaction effects were not statistically significant they were removed from the model.  
In each case the null hypothesis was that all group means for the dependent variable are 
equal (Ho: µ1 = µ2 = …= µ12). The alternative hypothesis was that the group means are 
different for the dependent variable (Ha: µ1 ≠ µ2 ≠ …≠ µ12). As proposed in Chapter 2, I 
hypothesized that levels of social bias should increase with skin tone, from light skin to 
dark skin and should increase with level of veiling, from no veil to hijab to niqab.  
Next, I explored whether Islamophobia and secularism could help explain the 
impact of skin tone and veiling on social bias. I added measures of Islamophobia 
(Islamophobia – AB, Islamophobia – CG, and Islamoprejudice) and secularism (Secular 
Critique of Islam and Secularism scale) as covariates to the models and examined 
interaction effects. For each dependent variable, I will describe the results of the best 
fitting models. An alpha = 0.05 was used in all tests of significant and the strength of the 
models was determined by model R2.  
Attraction 
 Table 4.1a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would 
like and become friends with her.”  Overall, participants did not express a great deal of 
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liking toward the targets. Most of the averages fell near the midpoint of the response 
scale (5.0 or 50%).  The highest probability estimate of liking was given by female 
participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M =  61.7%) and the lowest was 
given by male participants to the dark skinned target wearing the hijab (M = 38.1%).  
Table 4.1b shows the results of the statistical analysis of these responses. There were no 
significant interaction effects, and the only significant main effect was participant sex 
(F(1,349) = 6.01, p = .01).  Male participants indicated a significantly lower probability 
of liking and becoming friends with the target (M = 48.9%) than female participants (M = 
55.3%), independent of skin tone or veil. 
Table 4.1a 
 
Mean responses to the probability of liking and becoming friends with target. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 36 6.17  34 5.15  37 5.62 
 Dark Skin 38 5.47  34 6.00  44 4.91 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 5.14  17 5.35  20 5.30 
 Dark Skin 20 4.95  32 3.81  17 5.59 
Note. Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
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Table 4.1b 
 
ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming friends with target. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.01 .01 .65 
Skin 1 2.47 .12 .27 
Veil 1 0.72 .40 .08 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 3.07, p = .03, R2 = .03 
 Table 4.2a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would 
enjoy spending time with her.”  Participants did not express a great desire to spend time 
with the target as most of the averages fell near the midpoint of the response scale (5.0 or 
50%).  The highest probability estimate of enjoying spending time with the target was 
given by female participants to the light skinned target wearing the hijab (M = 62.9%) 
and the lowest was given by male participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M 
= 46.4%).  Table 4.2b shows the results of statistical analysis of these responses.   There 
were no significant interaction effects, and the only significant main effect was 
participant sex (F(1, 349) = 6.80, p = .01).  Male participants indicated a significantly 
lower probability of enjoying spending time with the target (M = 49.3%) than female 
participants (M = 56.1%), independent of skin tone or veil. 
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Table 4.2a 
 
Mean responses to the probability of enjoying spending time with target. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 36 5.78  34 5.44  37 5.76 
 Dark Skin 38 5.34  34 6.29  44 5.18 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 4.64  17 5.06  20 5.35 
 Dark Skin 20 4.90  32 4.88  17 5.59 
Note.  Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
 
Table 4.2b 
ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time with target. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.80 .01 .92 
Skin 1 0.22 .64 .03 
Veil 1 0.41 .52 .05 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 2.54, p = .06, R2 = .02 
 Table 4.3a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would 
work with her on some project of mutual interest.”  Participants were more likely to 
express attraction for this measure than the previous two measures.  Even though all of 
the responses fell above the midpoint of the response scale (5.0 or 50%), there was no 
condition in which participants estimated the probability that they would work with the 
target to be higher than 70%. The highest probability estimate of working with the target 
was given by female participants to the dark skinned target wearing the hijab (M = 
68.2%) and the lowest was given by female participants to the dark skinned target 
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wearing the niqab (M = 57.3%).  Table 4.3b shows the results of the statistical analysis of 
these responses.   There were no significant interaction or main effects in this model. 
Table 4.3a 
 
Mean responses to the probability of working with target. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 36 6.64  34 6.12  37 6.46 
 Dark Skin 38 6.16  34 6.82  44 5.73 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 5.82  17 5.82  20 6.05 
 Dark Skin 20 6.10  32 5.81  17 6.59 
Note.  Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
 
Table 4.3b 
ANCOVA results for the probability of working with target. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.27 .26 .86 
Skin 1 0.08 .78 .05 
Veil 1 0.13 .72 .09 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 0.48, p = .69, R2 = .004 
Table 4.4a shows mean responses to the Attraction Index, which was a single 
measure of attraction based on participants’ rating of the target on ten bipolar adjectives.  
Overall, participants did not report high levels of attraction toward the target. Most of the 
averages fell around the midpoint of the response scale (4.00).  The highest Attraction 
Index score was given by female participants to the dark skinned target wearing the hijab 
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(M = 4.84), and the lowest was given by male participants to the light skinned target with 
no veil (M = 4.06).  Table 4.4b shows the results of the statistical analysis of these 
responses.   There were no significant interaction effects, but the main effects of 
participant sex (F(1, 350) = 10.99, p = .001) and veil (F(1, 350) = 11.85, p = .0006) were 
statistically significant.  Male participants indicated significantly lower Attraction Index 
scores (M = 4.23) than female participants (M = 4.23), independent of skin tone or veil. 
Independent of skin tone or participant sex, as veil coverage increased, attraction 
increased (b = 0.15).  
Table 4.4a 
 
Mean responses to the Attraction Index. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 36 4.29  34 4.60  37 4.66 
 Dark Skin 39 4.07  34 4.84  44 4.55 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 4.06  17 4.57  20 4.09 
 Dark Skin 20 4.16  32 4.28  17 4.29 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater attraction. 
 
Table 4.4b 
ANCOVA results for Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 10.99 .001 .48 
Skin 1 0.06 .81 .002 
Veil 1 11.85 .0006 .52 
Note. Model F (3, 348) = 7.94, p < .0001, R2 = .06 
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 Summary of Attraction. Overall, participants expressed very little attraction 
toward any of the targets. While they expressed higher probabilities that they would work 
with the target on a project of mutual interest, means for the other attraction measures 
generally fell near the midpoint of the scales. Participant sex had the largest effect on 
attraction. Overall, male participants expressed less attraction toward the targets than 
female participants. The effects of skin tone and veil were not very strong. For the 
Attraction Index, the impact of veil was in an unexpected direction. It was hypothesized 
that as veil coverage increased, attraction would decrease. This was not the case for the 
Attraction Index.  
Similarity 
Table 4.5a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that she would 
turn out to come from the same social background as myself.”  Mean responses to this 
question varied substantially across conditions. Most of the averages fell below the 
midpoint of the response scale (5.0 or 50%).  The highest probability estimate of similar 
social background was given by female participants to the light skinned target with no 
veil (M = 64.0%), and the lowest was given by male participants to the light skinned 
target wearing the niqab (M = 18.5%).  Table 4.5b shows the results of the statistical 
analysis of these responses. The three-way interaction was not statistically significant. 
There was a significant main effect for participant sex (F(1, 349) = 4.66, p = .03). Male 
participants indicated a significantly lower probability that the target would come from 
the same social background (M = 2.88) than female participants (M = 3.33), independent 
of skin tone or veil. There was a significant main effect for veil (F(1, 349) = 101.72, p < 
.0001) and a significant skin tone X veil interaction (F(1, 349) = 4.79, p = .03).  As veil 
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coverage increased, probability decreased that the targets would come from the same 
social background as the participant (b = -1.17). Inspection of the interaction effect 
showed that the slope of this decrease was significantly steeper for the light skin tone 
target (b = -0.65).  
Table 4.5a 
 
Mean responses to the probability of coming from the same background. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 6.40  34 1.88  37 2.35 
 Dark Skin 39 4.56  34 2.68  44 2.23 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 4.86  17 2.53  20 1.85 
 Dark Skin 20 4.25  32 2.00  17 1.88 
Note. Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
 
Table 4.5b 
ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same background.  
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 4.66 .03 .04 
Skin 1 3.28 .07 .03 
Veil 1 101.72  < .0001 .89 
Skin*Veil 1 4.79 .03 .04 
Note. Model F (4, 344) = 28.05, p < .0001, R2 = .24 
 
Table 4.6a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would be 
able to understand her personality fairly well.”  On average, mean responses hovered 
around the midpoint of the scale (5.0 or 50%). The highest probability estimate of 
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understanding her personality was given by female participants to the light skinned target 
with no veil (M = 68.0%), and the lowest was given by male participants to the dark 
skinned target wearing the hijab (M = 44.4%).  Table 4.6b shows the results of the 
statistical analysis of these responses.   There were no significant interaction effects, but 
the main effects of skin tone (F(1, 349) = 4.42, p = .04) and veil (F(1, 349) = 7.93, p = 
.005) were statistically significant. Participants indicated that they were more likely to 
understand that light skinned target’s personality fairly well (M = 5.76) than dark skinned 
target’s personality (M = 5.22).  Furthermore, as veil coverage increased, participants’ 
decreased their estimates of understanding the target’s personality (b = -0.43), 
independent of skin tone or participant sex. 
Table 4.6a 
 
Mean responses to the probability of understanding target. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 6.80  34 5.59  37 5.81 
 Dark Skin 39 5.64  34 5.06  44 4.95 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 5.91  17 5.12  20 4.50 
 Dark Skin 20 6.05  32 4.44  17 5.76 
Note. Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
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Table 4.6b 
ANCOVA results for the probability of understanding target. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.65 .10 .18 
Skin 1 4.43 .04 .30 
Veil 1 7.93   .005 .53 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 4.94, p = .002, R2 = .04; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Table 4.7a shows mean responses to, “Estimate the probability that I would 
discover that her plans for the future are similar to my own.”  Overall, participants did not 
think that their future plans were similar to the target’s plans. Most of the averages fell 
below the midpoint of the response scale (5.0 or 50%).  The highest probability estimate 
of similarity was given by female participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M 
= 56.6%) and the lowest was given by male participants to the dark skinned target 
wearing the hijab (M = 33.4%).  Table 4.7b shows the results of the statistical analysis of 
these responses.   There were no significant interaction effects, and the only significant 
main effect was participant sex (F(1,349) = 16.27, p < .0001).  Male participants 
indicated a significantly lower probability that the target’s future plans were similar to 
their own (M = 37.3%) than female participants (M = 47.3%), independent of skin tone 
or veil. 
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Table 4.7a 
 
Mean responses to the probability that plans for the future are similar. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 5.66  34 4.29  37 4.46 
 Dark Skin 39 4.82  34 5.12  44 4.16 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 3.77  17 4.24  20 3.50 
 Dark Skin 20 3.65  32 3.34  17 4.24 
Note.  Response values range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
probability. 
 
Table 4.7b 
ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future are similar. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 16.27 < .0001 .80 
Skin 1  0.36 .55 .02 
Veil 1  3.64 .06 .18 
Note. Model F(3, 347) = 6.59, p = .0002, R2 = .05 
 
Table 4.8a shows mean responses to the Similarity Index, which is a measure 
comprised of participants’ ratings of ten characteristics as either stronger in their 
personality or the target’s. Participants rated the targets as relatively similar to 
themselves. All of the averages were above the midpoint of the scale (1.5) that ranged 
from 0 (stronger in my/her personality) to 3 (similar in both our personalities). Most of 
the averages were above 2. The highest Similarity Index score was given by female 
participants to the light skinned target wearing a niqab (M = 2.36) and the lowest was 
given by male participants to the dark skinned target with no veil (M = 1.84).  Table 4.8b 
56 
 
 
shows the results of the statistical analysis of these responses.   There were no significant 
interaction effects, but all three of the main effects were statistically significant: skin tone 
(F(1, 349) = 4.30,  p = .04), veil (F(1, 349) = 7.65,  p = .006), and participant sex (F(1, 
349) = 4.40,  p = .04).  Female participants were more likely to rate the targets as more 
similar to their personality (M = 2.26) than male participants (M = 2.11), independent of 
skin tone or veil. Participants rated the light skinned targets as more similar to their 
personality (M = 2.27) than dark skinned targets (M = 2.14), independent of veil or 
participant sex. As veil coverage increased so did participants’ reports of similarity (b = 
0.11), independent of skin tone or participant sex. 
Table 4.8a 
 
Mean responses to the Similarity Index. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 2.22  34 2.34  37 2.36 
 Dark Skin 39 2.08  34 2.29  44 2.26 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 2.06  17 2.35  20 2.26 
 Dark Skin 20 1.84  32 1.98  17 2.31 
Note.  Response values range from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating greater similarity. 
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Table 4.8b 
ANCOVA results for Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 4.40 .04 .27 
Skin 1 4.30 .04 .26 
Veil 1 7.65 .006 .47 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 5.63, p = .0009, R2 = .05 
 
Summary of Similarity. While participants did not express much similarity with 
the target’s social background or future plans, they expressed more similarity in 
personality characteristics. When participants’ sex had a statistically significant effect, 
female participants were more likely to express similarity with the targets than male 
participants. In contrast to the results for attraction, targets’ veil coverage had an impact 
on similarity.  When considering the target’s social background and understanding her 
personality, the effect for veil was as hypothesized. As veil coverage increased, 
participants’ perceptions of similarity decreased. For the Similarity Index, the impact of 
veil was in an unexpected direction: as veil coverage increased, Similarity Index scores 
increased. Skin tone also had an impact on similarity. In terms of understanding and 
personality, participants expressed more similarity with light skinned targets than dark 
skinned targets.  
Social Distance 
Table 4.9a shows mean responses to, “Please select the highest degree of 
association you would desire to have with someone like her.” This measure of social 
distance, asked participants to indicate the level of contact they would like with the 
target. Responses ranged from 1 = to marry into my family to 7 = to keep out of my 
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country. Mean responses generally ranged between a value of 3 (corresponding to having 
as a next door neighbor) and 4 (working in the same office).  Remarkably, participants, 
on average, did not want any of the targets to be best friends (2.0) or to marry into their 
families (1.0). The highest social distance was given by male participants to the dark 
skinned target wearing a niqab (M = 4.18) and the lowest social distance was given by 
female participants to the dark skinned target wearing the hijab (M = 3.18).  Table 4.9b 
shows the results of statistical analysis of these responses. There were no significant 
interaction effects, and the only significant main effect was participant sex (F(1,347) = 
6.89, p = .009).  Male participants indicated significantly more social distance (M = 3.87) 
than female participants (M = 3.47), independent of skin tone or veil.  
Table 4.9a 
 
Mean responses for social distance. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 34 3.44  34 3.44  37 3.32 
 Dark Skin 39 3.85  34 3.18  44 3.52 
Male          
 Light Skin 21 3.95  17 3.71  20 3.75 
 Dark Skin 20 3.60  32 4.00  17 4.18 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater social 
distance. 
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Table 4.9b 
ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.89 .009 .88 
Skin 1 0.73 .39 .09 
Veil 1 0.24 .62 .03 
Note. Model F(3, 345) = 2.68, p = .05, R2 = .02 
 
Moral Outrage 
Table 4.10a shows mean responses to the Moral Outrage index. Moral Outrage 
was measured by asking participants to report their reaction to the target. Responses to 
nine bipolar judgments (i.e. not at all offensive – highly offensive) were averaged to 
create an index score, where higher values indicate greater moral outrage.  Overall, 
participants did not express a great deal of moral outrage toward the targets. Mean 
responses for each condition fell below the scale mid-point (4.0). The highest mean 
Moral Outrage score was given by male participants to the light skinned target with no 
veil (M = 3.76) and the lowest was given by female participants to the dark skinned target 
wearing the hijab (M = 3.38).  Table 4.10b shows the results of the statistical analysis of 
these responses.   There were no significant interaction effects, and the only significant 
main effect was participant sex (F(1,349) = 8.41, p = .004).  Male participants indicated 
significantly higher moral outrage toward the targets (M = 3.63) than female participants 
(M = 3.47), independent of skin tone or veil.  
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Table 4.10a 
 
Mean responses to the Moral Outrage Index. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 3.47  34 3.36  37 3.50 
 Dark Skin 39 3.52  34 3.38  44 3.54 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 3.76  17 3.60  20 3.74 
 Dark Skin 20 3.61  32 3.53  17 3.55 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating greater moral 
outrage. 
 
Table 4.10b 
ANCOVA results for Moral Outrage. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 8.41 .004 .86 
Skin 1 0.31 .58 .03 
Veil 1 0.02 .90 .11 
Note. Model F (3, 347) = 2.89, p = .04, R2 = .02 
Stereotype Content 
Competence. Table 4.11a shows mean responses to the Competence stereotype 
items. Competence was measured using an average of participants’ ratings of the targets 
competence, confidence, independence, competitiveness, and intelligence. Overall, 
participants rated the targets as not very competent. Mean responses did not generally 
exceed the scale mid-point value of 3.0, and those means that did exceed 3.0 were only 
for the no veil condition.  The highest competence rating was given by female 
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participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M = 3.65) and the lowest was given 
by male participants to the light skinned target wearing the niqab (M = 2.03).  Table 
4.11b shows the results of the statistical analysis of these responses.   There were no 
significant interaction effects, and the only significant main effect was veil (F(1,346) = 
41.61, p < .0001). Independent of participant sex and target skin tone, the greater the veil 
coverage, the lower the rating of competence (b = -0.63). This relationship was as 
hypothesized.  
Table 4.11a 
 
Mean responses to the Competence stereotype items. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 3.65  34 2.59  37 2.22 
 Dark Skin 39 3.28  34 2.41  44 2.18 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 3.43  17 2.45  20 2.03 
 Dark Skin 20 3.29  30 2.63  17 2.20 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater 
competence. 
 
Table 4.11b 
ANCOVA for the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.31 .58 .003 
Skin 1 1.21 .27 .01 
Veil 1 123.43 < .0001 .99 
Note. Model F(3, 345) = 41.61, p < .0001, R2 = .27 
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Warmth. Table 4.12a shows mean responses to the Warmth stereotype items. 
Warmth was measured using an average of participants’ ratings of the targets tolerance, 
warmth, good-naturedness, and sincerity. Overall, participants rated the targets as not 
very warm. Only three out of the twelve mean condition responses exceeded the scale 
mid-point value of 3.0.  The highest warmth rating was given by female participants to 
the light skinned target with no veil (M = 3.31) and the lowest was given by female 
participants to the dark skinned target wearing the niqab (M = 2.34).  Table 4.12b shows 
the results of statistical analysis of these responses.   There were no significant interaction 
effects, and the only significant main effect was veil (F(1,347) = 29.27, p < .0001). 
Independent of participant sex and target skin tone, the greater the veil coverage, the 
lower the rating of warmth (b = -0.34). This relationship supported my hypotheses.  
Table 4.12a 
 
Mean responses to the Warmth stereotype items. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 3.31  34 2.85  37 2.39 
 Dark Skin 39 2.84  34 2.75  44 2.34 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 3.18  17 2.69  20 2.36 
 Dark Skin 20 2.96  30 3.05  17 2.53 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater warmth. 
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Table 2.12b 
ANCOVA for the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.59 .44 .02 
Skin 1 0.74 .39 .02 
Veil 1 29.27 < .0001 .96 
Note. Model F (3, 345) = 10.35, p < .0001, R2 = .08 
Status. Table 4.13a shows mean responses to the Status stereotype items. Status 
was measured using an average of participants’ ratings of how they think society views 
the target in terms of prestigious jobs, economic success and education. Overall, 
participants did not rate the targets as having particularly high social status. Only three 
out of the twelve mean condition responses exceeded the scale mid-point value of 3.0; 
these means were all in the no veil condition. The highest status rating was given by 
female participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M = 3.80) and the lowest was 
given by female participants to the dark skinned target wearing the niqab (M = 2.20).  
Table 4.13b shows the results of the statistical analysis of these responses. In this model, 
there were significant main effects for skin tone F(1, 346) = 5.60,  p = .02) and for veil 
(1, 346) = 83.17,  p < .0001), as well as the interaction effect between these two factors 
(F(1, 346) = 13.81,  p = .0002). Participants rated light skinned targets as higher in social 
status (M = 2.85) than dark skinned targets (M = 2.63). As veil coverage increased 
participants’ ratings of target’s status decreased (b = -0.30). This was true for both light 
and dark skinned targets, but inspection of the interaction showed that the downward 
slope was significantly steeper when target’s skin tone was light (b = -.41). These 
relationships partially supported my hypotheses.  
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Table 4.13a 
 
Mean responses to the Status stereotype items. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 3.80  34 2.57  37 2.28 
 Dark Skin 38 3.08  33 2.68  44 2.30 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 3.48  17 2.69  20 2.20 
 Dark Skin 20 2.70  31 2.54  17 2.48 
Note.  Response values range from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater status. 
 
Table 4.13b 
ANCOVA results for the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.36 .24 .01 
Skin 1 5.60 .02 .05 
Veil 1 83.17 < .0001 .80 
Skin*Veil 1 13.81 .0002 .13 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 25.56, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Competition. Table 4.14a shows mean responses to the Competition stereotype 
items. Competition was measured using an average of participants’ ratings of how they 
think society views the target in terms of special treatment, power, and resources. As 
shown in the table, all of the mean competition scores above the mid-point of the scale 
(3.0) were either for a veiled or dark skinned target. The highest competition rating was 
given by male participants to the light skinned target wearing a hijab (M = 3.37) and the 
lowest was given by male participants to the light skinned target with no veil (M = 2.26). 
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Table 4.14b shows the results of the statistical analysis of these responses.   In this model, 
there was a statistically significant main effect of veil F(1, 346) = 12.17,  p = .0005), plus 
a significant skin tone X veil interaction effect F(1, 346) = 8.20,  p = .005). Overall, as 
veil coverage increased participants’ ratings of perceived competition with the targets 
also increased (b = 0.04). This was true for both light and dark skinned targets, but 
inspection of the interaction showed that the upward slope was steeper when target’s skin 
tone was light (b = 0.40). These relationships partially supported my hypotheses. 
Table 4.14a 
Mean responses to the Competition stereotype items. 
 
 
 
Target Image 
Participant  No Veil Hijab  Niqab 
Female  N M  N M  N M 
 Light Skin 35 2.38  34 3.20  37 3.22 
 Dark Skin 38 2.75  33 2.98  44 2.84 
Male          
 Light Skin 22 2.26  17 3.37  20 3.22 
 Dark Skin 20 3.10  31 3.08  17 3.24 
Note. Response values range from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating greater 
competition. 
 
Table 4.14b 
ANCOVA results for the Competition stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.42 .23 .07 
Skin 1 0.06 .81 .003 
Veil 1 12.17 .0005 .56 
Skin*Veil 1 8.20 .005 .38 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 5.30, p = .0004, R2 = .06; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
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Summary of Stereotype Content. Veiling had a significant impact on stereotype 
content. Veiled targets were viewed as low in competence, status and warmth. Veiled 
targets were rated as high in terms of competition. Relative to targets with no veil, the 
veiled targets fell into the “low, low” quadrant of the stereotype content model; 
participants viewed them as social loafers deserving of contempt (Fiske et al, 2002).  
Islamophobia 
To gain a deeper understanding of the source of social bias and to further examine 
some of the unexpected findings from the ANCOVAs, I added covariates that measure 
participants’ degree of Islamophobia to each of the best-fitting models as described 
above. Islamophobia, or a fear of Muslims, was measured using the following previously 
established subscales: Islamophobia – AB, Islamophobia – CG, and Islamoprejudice. 
Since Islamophobia should have no relevance toward participants’ responses to targets 
with no veil, participants’ level of Islamophobia should have no impact on ratings of 
liking, similarity, moral outrage, social distance and stereotype content in the no veil 
conditions. On the other hand, Islamophobia should have significant relevance on 
participants’ responses to targets wearing the hijab or niqab. In these cases, participants’ 
level of Islamophobia should impact their ratings of liking, similarity, moral outrage, 
social distance, and stereotype content. Participants with higher Islamophobia should 
indicate more social bias toward veiled targets than participants with lower Islamophobia. 
In other words, by adding measures of Islamophobia as covariates, it is possible to test 
whether, and gauge how much, fear of Muslims can explain reactions toward women 
who veil, relative to targets with no veil (baseline or control condition). Furthermore, by 
using three different measures of Islamophobia, it is possible to test which measure best 
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explains social bias toward women who veil. The purpose of the following analyses is to 
examine the veil*Islamophobia interaction effect. In the plots of the interaction effects, I 
use the values of one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the 
mean to indicate “high” and “low” Islamophobia.  
 Attraction and Islamophobia. Tables 4.15a, b, and c show, for each measure of 
Islamophobia, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the 
probability that you would like and become friends with her.” There was the expected 
statistically significant interaction with veil only for Islamophobia – AB (F(1, 347) = 
5.17, p = .02). Figure 4.1 shows a plot of this interaction. When responding to targets 
with no veil, the probability of liking and becoming friends with the target was relatively 
unaffected by level of Islamophobia – AB. However, when responding to targets wearing 
the hijab, and especially the niqab, the probability of liking and becoming friends with 
the target decreased sharply as Islamophobia – AB increased. For all levels of veil, as 
Islamophobia – AB increased, the probability that participants would like and become 
friends with the target decreased. This downward slope was steepest for the niqab 
condition and more gradual for the no veil condition. There were no significant 
interaction effects between veil and the other two measures of Islamophobia. 
Islamophobia – CG (b = -0.06) and Islamoprejudice (b = -0.11) were statistically 
significant predictors. In both cases, independent of all other variables, as Islamophobia 
increased, participants’ estimated probability that they would like and become friends 
with the target decreased, no matter what she looked like. 
For all three measures of Islamophobia, the addition of the covariate increased the 
strength of the model, and in all three cases, the model R2 more than tripled (.03 to 
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between .11 and .16). The addition of Islamophobia – AB, as a covariate, resulted in the 
strongest model (R2 = .16). For all three models, the Islamophobia measure was the main 
predictor of the variation in participants’ estimated probability that they would like and 
become friends with the target. 
Table 4.15a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming friends 
with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.81 .37 .01 
Skin 1 1.62 .20 .03 
Veil 1 3.58 .06 .06 
Islamophobia - AB 1 49.62 <.0001 .82 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 5.17 .02 .09 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 13.40, p < .0001, R2 = .16; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.15b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming friends 
with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.09 .15 .05 
Skin 1 1.47 .23 .04 
Veil 1 0.17 .68 .004 
Islamophobia - CG 1 34.81 <.0001 .90 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 10.83, p < .0001, R2 = .11; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.15c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming friends with 
the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.79 .10 .06 
Skin 1 1.55 .21 .03 
Veil 1 0.58 .45 .01 
Islamoprejudice 1 41.50 <.0001 .89 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 12.54, p < .0001, R2 = .13; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Figure 4.1. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and the probability of liking 
and becoming friends with target by level of veil 
 
Tables 4.16a, b, and c show, for each measure of Islamophobia, the results of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would enjoy 
spending time with her.” As seen in the tables, the expected veil*Islamophobia 
interaction was not statistically significant in any of these models. Independent of all 
other variables, as Islamophobia increased, participants indicated less likelihood of 
enjoying spending with the target (Islamophobia – AB (b = -0.14), Islamophobia – CG (b 
= -0.11), and Islamoprejudice (b = -1.60)). In all cases, adding a measure of Islamophobia 
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greatly increased the overall strength of the model (from R2 = .02) and the addition of 
Islamophobia – AB resulted in the strongest model (R2 = .17). In each model, the 
measure of Islamophobia was the main predictor of the variation in participants’ 
estimated probability that they would enjoy spending time with the target. 
Table 4.16a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time with 
the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.89 .35 .01 
Skin 1 0.01 .94 .0001 
Veil 1 1.39 .24 .02 
Islamophobia - AB 1 63.52 <.0001 .97 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 18.00, p < .0001, R2 = .17; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.16b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time with 
the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.60 .11 .06 
Skin 1 0.01 .94 .0001 
Veil 1 1.43 .23 .03 
Islamophobia - CG 1 42.20 <.0001 .91 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 12.56, p < .0001, R2 = .13; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.16c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time with the 
target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.38 .07 .06 
Skin 1 0.01 .93 .0001 
Veil 1 0.70 .40 .01 
Islamoprejudice 1 56.15 <.0001 .93 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 16.12, p < .0001, R2 = .16; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Tables 4.17 a, b, and c show, for each measure of Islamophobia, the results of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would work 
with her on some project of mutual interest.” There was the expected statistically 
significant interaction with veil for Islamophobia – AB (F(1, 347) = 8.83, p = .003) and 
Islamoprejudice (F(1, 347) = 4.97, p = .03). Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show plots of these 
interactions. For targets with no veil, Islamophobia had very little impact on the 
likelihood of working together. However, for veiled targets, the likelihood of working 
together decreased significantly as Islamophobia increased. The downward slope was 
especially steep for targets wearing the niqab. In the case of Islamophobia – CG, there 
was no interaction with veil. As Islamophobia – CG increased, participants indicated that 
they would be less likely to work with the target (b = -0.08), no matter what she looked 
like. 
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Table 4.17a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the probability of working with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.00 .98 .00002 
Skin 1 0.00 .95 .00009 
Veil 1 7.35 .01 .16 
Islamophobia - AB 1 30.33 <.0001 .65 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 8.83 .003 .19 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 8.76, p < .0001, R2 = .11; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.17b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the probability of working with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.14 .71 .006 
Skin 1 0.00 .98 .00002 
Veil 1 0.00 .98 .00002 
Islamophobia - CG 1 23.57 <.0001 .99 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 6.25, p < .0001, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.17c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the probability of working with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.54 .46 .02 
Skin 1 0.02 .90 .006 
Veil 1 4.55 .03 .16 
Islamoprejudice 1 18.28 <.0001 .64 
Veil*Islamoprejudice 1 4.97 .03 .18 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 5.35, p < .0001, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Figure 4.2. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and the probability of 
working with the target by level of veil 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Relationship between Islamoprejudice and the probability of working 
with the target by level of veil 
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– AB (R2 = .11). For all three models, Islamophobia was the main predictor of the 
variation in participants’ estimated probability that they would work with the target. 
Tables 4.18 a, b, and c show, for each measure of Islamophobia, the results of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to the Attraction Index. There was the expected 
statistically significant interaction with veil for Islamophobia – AB (F(1, 347) = 6.39, p = 
.01). Figure 4.4 shows a plot of this interaction. Level of Islamophobia – AB had no 
influence on the Attraction Index for targets with no veil. For veiled targets, Attraction 
Index scores decreased as Islamophobia – AB scores increased. The downward slope was 
steepest for targets wearing the niqab. There were no statistically significant interaction 
effects with veil for Islamophobia – CG and Islamoprejudice. In both cases, increases 
Islamophobia – CG (b = -0.02) and Islamoprejudice (b = -0.37) decreased Attraction 
Index scores, no matter what the target looked like. 
Table 4.18a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 5.08 .02 .11 
Skin 1 0.00 .99 .000001 
Veil 1 14.87 .0001   .31 
Islamophobia - AB 1 21.72 <.0001 .45 
Veil*Islamophobia – AB 1 6.39 .01 .13 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 11.06, p < .0001, R2 = .14; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.18b 
Islamophobia – CG ANCOVA results for the Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.49 .01 .16 
Skin 1 0.00 .97 .00004 
Veil 1 14.59 .0002 .36 
Islamophobia - CG 1 19.66 <.0001 .48 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 10.99, p < .0001, R2 = .11; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.18c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 7.11 .01 .13 
Skin 1 0.00 .95 .00007 
Veil 1 13.22 .0003 .25 
Islamoprejudice 1 33.28 <.0001 .62 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 14.63, p < .0001, R2 = .14; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Figure 4.4. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and the Attraction Index by 
level of veil 
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Participant sex remained statistically significant in all of the models. When 
controlling for Islamophobia, female participants rated the targets as significantly more 
attractive (M = 4.49) than male participants (M = 4.24).  Adding a measure of 
Islamophobia increased the overall strength of the model (from R2 = .06) and the 
strongest models included Islamophobia – AB and Islamoprejudice (R2 = .14). For all 
three models, the measure of Islamophobia was the main predictor of the variation in 
participants’ Attraction Index scores. 
Summary of Attraction and Islamophobia. Islamophobia – AB provided a fairly 
good explanation for participants’ attraction toward targets wearing a veil. For three of 
the four attraction variables (liking, working together, and the Attraction Index) 
Islamophobia – AB resulted in the expected interaction with veil: Islamophobia – AB had 
little impact on participants’ ratings of the target with no veil, however Islamophobia - 
AB substantially decreased participants’ attraction ratings of targets wearing the hijab 
and, even more so, targets wearing the niqab. These results suggest that, in terms of 
attraction, social bias toward women who veil is best predicted the affective/behavioral 
aspects of Islamophobia. The addition of Islamoprejudice resulted in the expected 
interaction with veil only for working together. Islamophobia – CG did not interact with 
veil for any of the attraction variables. In most instances, as Islamophobia – CG 
increased, attractiveness ratings decreased, no matter what the target looked like.  
 Similarity and Islamophobia. Tables 4.19 a, b, and c show, for each measure of 
Islamophobia, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the 
probability that she would turn out to come from the same social background as myself.” 
There was not a statistically significant veil*Islamophobia interaction for any of the 
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models. The addition of the Islamophobia covariates did not substantially change the 
results found in the previous analysis of this variable. The measures of Islamophobia 
were statistically significant in all of the models. Independent of all other variables, as 
Islamophobia increased, participants indicated that they would want to spend less time 
with the target, no matter what she looked like (Islamophobia – AB (b = -0.03), and 
Islamophobia – CG (b = -0.04), Islamoprejudice (b = -0.27)). Adding a measure of 
Islamophobia did not really improve the overall strength of the model (R2 went from .24 
to .25). In each model, the main effect of veil was the main predictor of variation in 
coming from the same background as the target. 
Table 4.19a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same 
background. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.95 .09 .03 
Skin 1 2.94 .09 .03 
Veil 1 100.15 <.0001 .88 
Veil*Skin 1 4.77 .03 .04 
Islamophobia - AB 1 2.45 .12 .02 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 22.91, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
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Table 4.19b 
Islamophobia – CG ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same 
background. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.07 .08 .03 
Skin 1 2.83 .09 .02 
Veil 1 99.44 <.0001 .86 
Veil*Skin 1 5.56 .02 .05 
Islamophobia - CG 1 4.52 .03 .04 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 23.46, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
Table 4.19c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same 
background. 
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.83 .05 .03 
Skin 1 2.97 .09 .03 
Veil 1 101.51 <.0001 .89 
Veil*Skin 1 4.67 .03 .04 
Islamophobia 1 1.42 .23 .01 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 22.64, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
Tables 4.20 a, b, and c show, for each measure of Islamophobia, the results of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would be able 
to understand her personality fairly well.” For all three models, there was a statistically 
significant interaction between the Islamophobia measure and veil. Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 
4.7 show plots of these interactions.  For veiled targets, as Islamophobia increased, 
participants were less likely to understand the target’s personality. This decrease was 
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steepest for the target wearing the niqab. Islamophobia had little impact on understanding 
for the target with no veil.  
Table 4.20a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA Results for the probability of understanding target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.00 .99 .000004 
Skin 1 3.93 .05 .04 
Veil 1 6.70 .01 .08 
Islamophobia - AB 1 60.61 <.0001 .69 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 16.26 <.0001 .19 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 20.04, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.20b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA Results for the probability of understanding target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.47 .49 .01 
Skin 1 2.84 .09 .06 
Veil 1 1.25 .26 .03 
Islamophobia - CG 1 37.87 <.0001 .78 
Veil*Islamophobia - CG 1 6.12 .01 .13 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 13.42, p < .0001, R2 = .16; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.20c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA Results for the probability of understanding target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.1 .30 .02 
Skin 1 3.99 .05 .07 
Veil 1 6.52 .01 .11 
Islamoprejudice 1 35.73 <.0001 .62 
Veil*Islamoprejudice 1 10.24 .002 .18 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 13.24, p < .0001, R2 = .16 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and the probability of 
understanding the target by level of veil 
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Figure 4.6. Relationship between Islamophobia - CG and the probability of 
understanding the target by level of veil 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Relationship between Islamoprejudice and the probability of 
understanding the target by level of veil 
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each model, the measure of Islamophobia was the main predictor of the variation in the 
probability of understanding the target’s personality. 
Tables 4.21 a, b, and c show, for each measure of Islamophobia, the results of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to, “Estimate the probability that you would discover 
that her plans for the future are similar to your own.” For the model with Islamophobia - 
AB, there was a statistically significant interaction with veil. Figure 4.8 shows a plot of 
this interaction. As hypothesized, Islamophobia – AB had little impact on participants’ 
responses to the target with no veil, but negatively impacted responses to targets wearing 
veils. This decrease in ratings was steepest for the niqab condition. There were no 
statistically significant interaction with veil for Islamophobia – CG and Islamoprejudice. 
Islamophobia – CG (b = -0.08) and Islamoprejudice (b = -1.17) had statistically 
significant main effects on ratings of sharing future plans with the target. In both cases, as 
Islamophobia increased, participants indicated that they would be less likely to share 
future plans with the target, no matter what she looked like. 
Table 4.21a 
Islamophobia – AB ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future are 
similar.  
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 8.21 .004 .15 
Skin 1 0.15 .70 .003 
Veil 1 3.83 .05 .07 
Islamophobia - AB 1 32.42 <.0001 .61 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 8.40 .004 .16 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 13.04, p < .0001, R2 = .16; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
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Table 4.21b 
Islamophobia – CG ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future are 
similar.  
 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 10.47 .001 .27 
Skin 1 0.11 .74 .003 
Veil 1 2.68 .10 .07 
Islamophobia - CG 1 26.12 <.0001 .66 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 11.61, p < .0001, R2 = .12; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.21c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future are similar.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 11.98 .0006 .26 
Skin 1 0.12 .72 .003 
Veil 1 3.81 .05 .08 
Islamoprejudice 1 29.4 <.0001 .65 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 12.48, p < .0001, R2 = .13; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
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Figure 4.8. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and the probability that 
future plans are similar by level of veil 
 
Adding a measure of Islamophobia greatly increased the overall strength of the model 
(from R2 = .05), and the strongest model included Islamophobia – AB (R2 = .16). For 
each model, Islamophobia was the main predictor of the variation in the sharing future 
plans with the target. 
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0.02), and Islamophobia – CG (b = -0.01), Islamoprejudice (b = -0.23)). In all cases, 
adding a measure of Islamophobia slightly improved the overall strength of the model 
(from R2 = .05), and the strongest model included Islamoprejudice (R2 = .09). In each 
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
low high
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
Islamophobia - AB
no veil
niqab
niqab
85 
 
 
model, the measure of Islamophobia was the main predictor of variance in Similarity 
Index scores.  
Table 4.22a 
Islamophobia – AB ANCOVA results for the Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.73 .19 .06 
Skin 1 3.92 .05 .14 
Veil 1 8.91 .003 .32 
Islamophobia 1 12.98 .0004 .47 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 7.63, p < .0001, R2 = .08; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.22b 
Islamophobia – CG ANCOVA results for the Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.66 .10 .11 
Skin 1 3.86 .05 .16 
Veil 1 8.94 .003 .36 
Islamophobia - CG 1 9.43 .002 .38 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 6.70, p < .0001, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.22c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.88 .09 .10 
Skin 1 3.88 .05 .13 
Veil 1 8.06 .0005 .27 
Islamoprejudice 1 15.22 .001 .51 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 8.22, p < .0001, R2 = .09; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Summary of Similarity and Islamophobia. The Islamophobia measures did not 
do a good job of explaining participants’ similarity ratings toward veiled targets, relative 
to targets with no veil. In most cases, increases in Islamophobia decreased similarity 
ratings, no matter what the target looked like. Islamophobia – AB was the best predictor 
of social bias toward women who veil and explained social bias for two of the four 
similarity variables (understanding and sharing future plans). In other words, 
Islamophobia – AB had little impact on similarity ratings toward targets with no veil, but 
significantly decreased ratings for targets wearing a veil. Islamophobia – CG and 
Islamoprejudice only explained social bias for one of the similarity variables 
(understanding).  
Social Distance and Islamophobia. Tables 4.23 a, b, and c show, for each 
measure of Islamophobia, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to, 
“Please select the highest degree of association you would desire to have with someone 
like her.” For all three models, there was a statistically significant interaction between 
veil and the Islamophobia measure. Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 show plots of these 
interactions. While the interaction effect is similar in all three plots, the plot for 
Islamophobia – AB displays it most clearly: Islamophobia has very little impact on social 
distance for targets with no veil, but as Islamophobia increases, social distance increases 
sharply for targets wearing a veil. Islamophobia explains participants’ social distance 
ratings toward veiled targets, relative to targets with no veil. The affective/behavioral 
measure of Islamophobia provides the clearest explanation of this interaction. Adding a 
measure of Islamophobia greatly increased the overall strength of the model (R2 = .02), 
and the strongest model included Islamophobia – AB (R2 = .29). 
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Table 4.23a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.76 .38 .005 
Skin 1 0.39 .53 .003 
Veil 1 24.84 <.0001  .17 
Islamophobia - AB 1 95.77 <.0001 .65 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 24.58 <.0001 .17 
Note. Model F(5, 341) = 28.14, p < .0001, R2 = .29; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.23b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.82 .09 .04 
Skin 1 0.14 .71 .002 
Veil 1 7.15 .008 .10 
Islamophobia - CG 1 56.15 <.0001 .78 
Veil*Islamophobia - CG 1 6.02 .01 .08 
Note. Model F(5, 341) = 16.11, p < .0001, R2 = .19; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.23c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.86 .05 .04 
Skin 1 0.38 .54 .004 
Veil 1 6.89 .009 .07 
Islamoprejudice 1 83.07 <.0001 .83 
Veil*Islamoprejudice 1 6.48 .01 .06 
Note. Model F(5, 341) = 20.99, p < .0001, R2 = .24; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
88 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Relationship between Islamophobia - AB and social distance by level 
of veil 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Relationship between Islamophobia - CG and social distance by 
level of veil 
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Figure 4.11. Relationship between Islamoprejudice and social distance by level of 
veil 
 
Moral Outrage and Islamophobia. Tables 4.24 a, b, and c show, for each 
measure of Islamophobia, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to the 
Moral Outrage Index. For all three models, there was a statistically significant interaction 
between veil and the Islamophobia measure. Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 show plots of 
these interactions. While the interaction effect is similar in all three plots, the plot for 
Islamophobia – AB displays it most clearly: Islamophobia has very little impact on moral 
outrage for targets with no veil, but as Islamophobia increases, moral outrage increases 
sharply for targets wearing a veil. Islamophobia explains participants’ moral outrage 
toward veiled targets, relative to targets with no veil. The affective/behavioral measure of 
Islamophobia provides the clearest explanation of this interaction. Adding a measure of 
Islamophobia greatly increased the overall strength of the model (from R2 = .02), and the 
addition of Islamophobia – AB produced the strongest model (R2 = .23). For all three 
models, the measure of Islamophobia was the main predictor of the variation in moral 
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Table 4.24a 
Islamophobia – AB ANCOVA results for Moral Outrage.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.91 .17 .02 
Skin 1 0.8 .37 .008 
Veil 1 12.53 .0005 .12 
Islamophobia - AB 1 72.26 <.0001 .71 
Veil*Islamophobia - AB 1 13.98 .0002 .14 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 20.67, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.24b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for Moral Outrage.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 4.1 .04 .05 
Skin 1 1.34 .25 .02 
Veil 1 7.26 .01 .09 
Islamophobia - CG 1 60.16 <.0001 .75 
Veil*Islamophobia - CG 1 7.8 .01 .10 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 17.76, p < .0001, R2 = .21; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.24c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for Moral Outrage.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 5.67 .02 .07 
Skin 1 0.72 .40 .01 
Veil 1 7.01 .01 .08 
Islamoprejudice 1 66.24 <.0001 .76 
Veil*Islamoprejudice 1 7.39 .01 .08 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 17.86, p < .0001, R2 = .21 
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Figure 4.12. Relationship between Islamophobia- AB and moral outrage by level 
of veil 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Relationship between Islamophobia- CG and moral outrage by level 
of veil 
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Figure 4.14. Relationship between Islamoprejudice and moral outrage by level of 
veil 
 
Stereotype Content and Islamophobia. Tables 4.25a – 4.28c show the results, 
for each measure of Islamophobia, of statistical analyses for the competence, warmth, 
status, and competition stereotype items. The addition of measures of Islamophobia as 
covariates did not significantly impact any of the models. There were no statistically 
significant veil*Islamophobia interaction effects. In other words, when asked how 
members of society would rate the targets on competence, warmth, status, and 
competition, participants’ levels of Islamophobia had little impact.  
Table 4.25a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.33 .57 .003 
Skin 1 1.22 .27 .01 
Veil 1 122.90 <.0001  .99 
Islamophobia - AB 1 0.02 .90 .0001 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 31.12, p < .0001, R2 = .27; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
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Table 4.25b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.33 .57 .003 
Skin 1 1.22 .27 .01 
Veil 1 122.72 <.0001  .99 
Islamophobia - CG 1 0.01 .91 .0001 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 31.12, p < .0001, R2 = .27; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.25c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.25 .62 .002 
Skin 1 1.17 .28 .009 
Veil 1 123.09 <.0001  .99 
Islamoprejudice 1 0.24 .63 .002 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 31.20, p < .0001, R2 = .27; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.26a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.98 .32 .03 
Skin 1 0.67 .41 .02 
Veil 1 28.62 <.0001 .91 
Islamophobia - AB 1 1.26 .26 .04 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 8.08, p < .0001, R2 = .09  
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Table 4.26b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.82 .37 .03 
Skin 1 0.67 .41 .02 
Veil 1 28.47 <.0001 .92 
Islamophobia - CG 1 0.89 .35 .03 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 7.98, p < .0001, R2 = .08 
Table 4.26c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.85 .36 .03 
Skin 1 0.65 .42 .02 
Veil 1 29.26 <.0001 .90 
Islamoprejudice 1 1.88 .17 .06 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 8.25, p < .0001, R2 = .09; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.27a 
Islamophobia – AB ANCOVA results for the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.51 .22 .01 
Skin 1 5.67 .02 .05 
Veil 1 83.17 <.0001 .80 
Veil*Skin 1 13.81 .0002 .13 
Islamophobia - AB 1 0.19 .66 .002 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 20.44, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.27b 
Islamophobia – CG ANCOVA results for the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.91 .17 .02 
Skin 1 5.96 .02 .06 
Veil 1 84.81 <.0001 .79 
Veil*Skin 1 12.96 .0004 .12 
Islamophobia - CG 1 2.19 .14 .02 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 20.96, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.27c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.26 .26 .01 
Skin 1 5.51 .02 .05 
Veil 1 82.91 <.0001 .80 
Veil*Skin 1 13.72 .0002 .13 
Islamoprejudice 1 0.09 .76 .009 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 20.41, p < .0001, R2 = .23; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.28a 
Islamophobia - AB ANCOVA results for the Competition stereotype items.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.91 .09 .08 
Skin 1 0.01 .93 .0002 
Veil 1 11.78 .0007 .33 
Skin*Veil 1 7.65 .01 .21 
Islamophobia - AB 1 8.81 .003 .25 
Sex*Islamophobia - AB 1 4.57 .03 .13 
Note. Model F(6, 341) = 5.63, p < .0001, R2 = .09; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding.  
Table 4.28b 
Islamophobia - CG ANCOVA results for the Competition stereotype items.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.91 .09 .08 
Skin 1 0.09 .76 .003 
Veil 1 12.01 .0006 .34 
Skin*Veil 1 8.88 .003 .25 
Islamophobia - CG 1 5.69 .02 .16 
Sex*Islamophobia - CG 1 5.40 .02 .15 
Note. Model F(6, 341) = 5.63, p < .0001, R2 = .09; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.28c 
Islamoprejudice ANCOVA results for the Competition stereotype items.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 9.40 .002 .18 
Skin 1 0.01 .908 .0003 
Veil 1 13.57 .0003 .26 
Skin*Veil 1 8.94 .003 .17 
Islamoprejudice 1 10.14 .002 .19 
Sex*Islamoprejudice 1 11.04 .001 .21 
Note. Model F(6, 341) = 6.55, p < .0001, R2 = .10; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Summary of Islamophobia. The main purpose of including covariate measures 
of Islamophobia in this study was to determine if participants’ fear of Muslims could help 
explain bias toward women who wear a veil, relative to those who do not. For 
Islamophobia to help explain bias, it must have an interaction with level of veil. A 
significant Islamophobia main effect would not really help to explain bias toward veiled 
women since an additive effect, which results in decreased ratings of all the target faces, 
does not help to explain biased reactions toward veiled targets versus those with no veil. 
A main effect for Islamophobia simply suggests that prejudiced people react more 
negatively toward all people, no matter what they look like. However, if there was a 
significant Islamophobia*veil interaction in the expected direction, it helps to explain 
social bias toward veiled women, relative to those with no veil. Overall, the inclusion of 
Islamophobia – AB, as a covariate, resulted in the most interactions with veil. These 
results suggest that Islamophobia can explain some social bias toward women who wear 
the hijab and especially the niqab, and that it is best characterized by affective and 
behavioral factors, as opposed to cognitive factors.  
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Secularism 
To gain a deeper understanding of the source of social bias and to further examine 
some of the results that contradicted my hypotheses, I added covariates that measure 
participants’ belief in secularism to each of the best-fitting models as described above. 
My purpose for adding measures of secularism, as covariates, to these models was to test 
whether a belief that religion should not play a role in government, education, or other 
public parts of society could help explain social bias toward women who wear a veil, 
relative to those who do not. My interest in the following analyses is the veil*secularism 
interactions. Secularist beliefs should have very little impact on participants’ evaluations 
of targets with no veils. However, belief in secularism should impact participants’ ratings 
of veiled targets. In the plots of the interaction effects, I used the values of one standard 
deviation above and below the mean to indicate “high” and “low” secularism.  
I used two measures of secularism in this study. The first measure was the Secular 
Critique of Islam subscale as designed by Irmhoff and Recker (2012). I designed the 
second measure of secularism (“Secularism scale”) using factor analysis of questionnaire 
items. First, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the secularism items. There 
were two items (“Circumcision of boys or girls is child abuse and should be banned” and 
“Animal sacrifice is barbaric and should be banned”) that did not load heavily on any of 
the factors. After considering the validity of these items, I determined that they were 
better measures of morality than secularism, so I removed them from the analysis. The 
remaining thirteen secularism items loaded onto two factors (See Appendix J). However, 
after further examination of the two factors, I noticed that the second factor was 
comprised of the three items that were negatively worded. All of the other items loaded 
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on the first factor. According to research conducted by Schmitt and Stults (1985), the 
factor comprised of the negatively keyed items could be produced very easily if only ten 
percent of respondents responded carelessly and failed to notice the negative-positive 
wording of the items.  
Following the advice of Schmitt and Stults (1985), I examined the responses for 
evidence of careless responding. While there were no clear patterns in the responses for 
the secularism items to indicate careless responding, I decided to remove the three 
negatively keyed items since they did not group together in any meaningful way. In fact, 
issues addressed in these items (religion, education, and government leaders) were 
captured in other items in the section, so I did not lose any information. 
I conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the remaining ten items and a one-
factor model was suggested (See Appendix J). Since all of the items grouped together and 
were highly correlated (α = .91), I created a single Secularism scale measure by 
averaging responses on the ten items. Secularism scale values ranged from 1 to 5 (M = 
3.22, SD = 0.84), with higher values indicting stronger secularism.  
Attraction and Secularism. Tables 4.29a – 4.32c show, for each measure of 
secularism, the results of statistical analyses of the responses to the three separate 
measure of attraction and the Attraction Index. Overall, adding measures of secularism to 
the models did not greatly improve the model strength. There were statistically 
significant veil X Secular Critique interactions for two of the four attraction variables: 
liking and becoming friends with the target and the Attraction Index. Figures 4.18 and 
4.19 show plots of these interactions. For liking and becoming friends with the target, an 
increased belief in the Secular Critique of Islam decreased ratings for veiled targets, 
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especially targets wearing the niqab, but did not lower ratings for targets with no veil. For 
the Attraction Index, an increased belief in the Secular Critique of Islam lowered ratings 
for the targets wearing the niqab, but not for the other targets. There were no 
veil*secularism interactions for models that included the Secularism scale as a covariate.   
Table 4.29a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming 
friends with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 5.21 .02 .24 
Skin 1 1.76 .19 .08 
Veil 1 5.40 .02 .25 
Secular Critique 1 3.24 .07 .15 
Veil*Secuālar Critique 1 6.16 .01 .28 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 3.10, p = .009, R2 = .04;  
Table 4.29b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability of liking and becoming friends with the 
target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 5.19 .02 .66 
Skin 1 2.00 .16 .26 
Veil 1 0.58 .45 .07 
Secularism 1 0.08 .78 .01 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 1.95, p = .10, R2 = .02 
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Table 4.30a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time 
with the target.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.00 .01 .85 
Skin 1 0.13 .72 .02 
Veil 1 0.57 .45 .08 
Secular Critique 1 0.38 .54 .05 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 1.83, p = .12, R2 = .02 
Table 4.30b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability of enjoying spending time with the target.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.26 .01 .84 
Skin 1 0.13 .72 .02 
Veil 1 0.50 .48 .07 
Secularism 1 0.58 .45 .08 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 1.94, p = .10, R2 = .03; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.31a 
 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability of working with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.26 .26 .65 
Skin 1 0.05 .83 .03 
Veil 1 0.09 .76 .05 
Secular Critique 1 0.53 .47 .27 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 0.46, p = .76, R2 = .005 
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Table 4.31b 
 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability of working with the target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.19 .28 .18 
Skin 1 0.05 .83 .007 
Veil 1 0.13 .72 .02 
Secularism 1 5.12 .02 .79 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 1.62, p = .17, R2 = .02; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.32a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 10.62 .001 .38 
Skin 1 0.00 1.00 .0000009 
Veil 1 10.27 .002 .37 
Secular Critique 1 0.09 .76 .003 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 7.06 .01 .25 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 6.05, p < .0001, R2 = .08; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.32b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the Attraction Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 10.16 .002 .43 
Skin 1 0.02 .88 .0009 
Veil 1 11.58 .001 .49 
Secularism 1 1.66 .20 .07 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 6.19, p < .0001, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Figure 4.18. Relationship between Secular Critique and liking and becoming 
friends with the target by level of veil 
 
 
Figure 4.19. Relationship between Secular Critique and the Attraction Index by 
level of veil 
 
In summary, the addition of the covariate measure of secularism did not greatly 
help to explain attraction toward women who wear the veil, relative to those who do not. 
Belief in secularism generally did not interact with veil in predicting attraction ratings, 
and did not improve the strength of the models.  
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Similarity and Secularism. Tables 4.33a – 4.36c show, for each measure of 
secularism, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to the four similarity 
measures. The Secularism scale did not significantly interact with veil for any of the 
similarity variables. The Secular Critique of Islam interacted with veil for two of the four 
similarity variables: understanding the target and having similar future plans. Figures 
4.20 and 4.21 show plots of these interactions. Both plots display similar interaction 
effects. While increases in Secular Critique have very little impact on similarity ratings 
for the targets with no veil, there was a substantial negative impact on similarity ratings 
for veiled targets, especially for targets wearing the niqab. Overall, adding measures of 
secularism as covariates did not help to explain social bias toward women who veil. With 
only two exceptions, secularism did not interact with veil in predicting similarity ratings.  
Table 4.33a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same 
background. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.81 .05 .03 
Skin 1 3.15 .08 .03 
Veil 1 100.73 <.0001 .86 
Veil*Skin 1 5.31 .02 .05 
Secular Critique 1 3.67 .06 .03 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 23.14, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
Table 4.33b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability of coming from the same background. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 4.46 .04 .04 
Skin 1 3.17 .08 .03 
Veil 1 100.73 <.0001 .88 
Veil*Skin 1 4.75 .03 .04 
Secularism 1 1.09 .30 .01 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 22.55, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
Table 4.34a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability of understanding target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.22 .14 .11 
Skin 1 3.54 .06 .17 
Veil 1 4.88 .03 .24 
Secular Critique 1 2.44 .12 .12 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 7.43 .01 .36 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 4.48, p = .0006, R2 = .06 
Table 4.34b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability of understanding target. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 2.27 .13 .16 
Skin 1 4.08 .04 .29 
Veil 1 7.94 .01 .56 
Secularism 1 0.01 .92 .0007 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 3.52, p = .008, R2 = .04; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.35a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future 
are similar.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 14.98 .0001 .56 
Skin 1 0.15 .70 .005 
Veil 1 3.86 .05 .14 
Secular Critique 1 2.55 .11 .09 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 5.37 .02 .20 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 4.96, p = .0002, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.35b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the probability that plans for the future are similar.  
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 15.49 .0001 .78 
Skin 1 0.29 .59 .01 
Veil 1 3.7 .06 .19 
Secularism 1 0.35 .56 .02 
Note. Model F(4, 345) = 4.82, p = .0009, R2 = .05 
Table 4.36a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for the Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.79 .05 .14 
Skin 1 4.84 .03 .18 
Veil 1 7.64 .01 .29 
Secular Critique 1 4.59 .03 .17 
Sex*Secular Critique 1 5.52 .02 .21 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 5.04, p = .0002, R2 = .07; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.36b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for the Similarity Index. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 3.15 .08 .15 
Skin 1 4.35 .04 .21 
Veil 1 7.51 .01 .36 
Secularism 1 0.02 .90 .0008 
Sex*Secularism 1 5.66 .02 .27 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 4.67, p = .0004, R2 = .06; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Figure 4.20. Relationship between Secular Critique and understanding the target 
by level of veil 
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Figure 4.21. Relationship between Secular Critique and plans for the future are 
similar by level of veil 
 
Social Distance and Secularism. Tables 4.37 a and b show, for each measure of 
secularism, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to “Please select the 
highest degree of association you would desire to have with someone like her.” The 
Secularism scale did not significantly interact with veil in predicting social distance, but 
the Secular Critique of Islam did. There was a statistically significant veil X Secular 
Critique interaction (F(1, 344) = 12.53, p = .0005). Figure 4.22 shows a plot of this 
interaction. As the Secular Critique of Islam increases, social distance toward targets 
wearing veils also increases, especially for targets wearing the niqab.  
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Table 4.37a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.73 .01 .19 
Skin 1 0.39 .53 .01 
Veil 1 12.84 .0004 .36 
Secular Critique 1 3.25 .07 .09 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 12.53 .0005 .35 
Note. Model F(5, 340) = 4.29, p = .0008, R2 = .06 
Table 4.37b 
Secularism ANCOVA results for social distance. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 6.64 .01 .77 
Skin 1 0.67 .41 .08 
Veil 1 0.23 .63 .03 
Secularism 1 1.05 .31 .12 
Note. Model F(4, 342) = 2.22, p = .07, R2 = .03 
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Figure 4.22. Relationship between Secular Critique and social distance by level of 
veil  
 
Moral Outrage and Secularism. Tables 4.38 a and b show, for each measure of 
secularism, the results of the statistical analyses of the responses to the Moral Outrage 
Index items. The Secularism scale did not significantly interact with veil in predicting 
moral outrage, but the Secular Critique of Islam did. There was a statistically significant 
veil X Secular Critique interaction (F(1, 347) = 9.22, p = .003). Figure 4.23 shows a plot 
of this interaction. As Secular Critique increases, so does moral outrage toward women 
who veil, especially those wearing the niqab. The fact that Secular Critique has very little 
impact on moral outrage toward targets with no veil, but substantial impact on those who 
do suggests that the Secular Critique of Islam can help to explain social bias toward 
women who veil.  
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Table 4.38a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results to Moral Outrage. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 8.53 .004 .23 
Skin 1 0.41 .52 .01 
Veil 1 8.93 .003 .24 
Secular Critique 1 10.15 .002 .27 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 9.22 .003 .25 
Note. Model F(5, 343) = 4.96, p = .0002, R2 = .07 
Table 4.38b 
Secularism ANCOVA results to Moral Outrage. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.95 .16 .27 
Skin 1 0.30 .58 .04 
Veil 1 0.03 .87 .004 
Secularism 1 0.01 .91 .002 
Sex*Secularism 1 4.82 .03 .68 
Note. Model F(5, 344) = 2.90, p = .01, R2 = .04; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Figure 4.23. Relationship between Secular Critique and Moral Outrage by level 
of veil 
 
Stereotype Content and Secularism. Tables 4.39a – 4.40b show, for each 
measure of secularism, the results of statistical analyses for the Competence and Warmth 
stereotype items. Neither measure of secularism significantly interaction with veil in 
predicting these stereotype contents. Participants’ ratings of how members of society 
view veiled or unveiled women in terms of competence and warmth were not impacted 
by belief in secularism.  
Table 4.39a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results to the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.35 .56 .003 
Skin 1 1.25 .26 .01 
Veil 1 122.60 <.0001 .99 
Secular Critique 1 0.00 .99 .0000003 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 31.06, p < .0001, R2 = .27; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.39b 
Secularism ANCOVA results to the Competence stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.33 .57 .003 
Skin 1 1.25 .26 .01 
Veil 1 122.62 <.0001 .97 
Secularism 1 2.51 .11 .02 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 31.97, p < .0001, R2 = .27; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
Table 4.40a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results to the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.59 .44 .02 
Skin 1 0.74 .39 .02 
Veil 1 28.99 <.0001 .96 
Secular Critique 1 0.02 .88 .0008 
Note. Model F(4, 343) = 7.72 p < .0001, R2 = .08 
Table 4.40b 
Secularism ANCOVA results to the Warmth stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 0.57 .45 .02 
Skin 1 0.76 .38 .02 
Veil 1 28.8 <.0001 .92 
Secularism 1 2.06 .15 .04 
Note. Model F(4, 344) = 8.30, p < .0001, R2 = .09 
Tables 4.41a and b show the results, for each measure of secularism, of the 
statistical analysis of the responses to the Status stereotype items. Secularism was not a 
114 
 
 
statistically significant predictor and while the Secular Critique of Islam was not 
statistically significant, there was a significant veil X Secular Critique interaction (F(1, 
345) = 9.12, p =.003). Figures 4.24a and b show plots of this interaction. Since there was 
also a significant skin tone X veil interaction in this model, I created one plot for light 
skinned targets and one for dark skinned targets. Overall, as the Secular Critique of Islam 
increased, participants’ ratings of social status for the targets with no veil increased and 
social status for the targets wearing the hijab and niqab decreased. The decrease was 
steepest for the target wearing the niqab.  
Table 4.41a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results to the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.39 .24 .04 
Skin 1 4.88 .03 .14 
Veil 1 2.04 .15 .06 
Skin*Veil 1 15.22 .0001 .42 
Secular Critique 1 3.22 .07 .09 
Veil*Secular Critique 1 9.12 .003 .25 
Note. Model F(6, 340) = 19.15, p < .0001, R2 = .25 
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Table 4.41b 
Secularism ANCOVA results to the Status stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.42 .23 .01 
Skin 1 5.71 .02 .05 
Veil 1 82.59 <.0001 .77 
Skin*Veil 1 13.78 .0002 .13 
Secularism 1 3.71 .05 .03 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 21.35, p < .0001, R2 = .24; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Figure 4.24a. Relationship between Secular Critique and Status by level of veil 
for light skinned targets 
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Figure 4.24b. Relationship between Secular Critique and Status by level of veil 
for dark skinned targets 
 
Tables 4.42a and b show the results, for each measure of secularism, of the 
statistical analyses of the responses to the Competition stereotype items. Neither Secular 
Critique no the Secularism scale significantly interacted with veil in these models. 
Neither measure of secularism appears to be relevant in predicting participants’ ratings of 
how members of society view veiled and unveiled women in terms of competition.  
Table 4.42a 
Secular Critique of Islam ANCOVA results to the Competition stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 4.84 .03 .14 
Skin 1 0.13 .72 .004 
Veil 1 12.52 .0005 .35 
Skin*Veil 1 8.26 .004 .23 
Secular Critique 1 3.71 .06 .10 
Sex*Secular Critique 1 5.97 .02 .17 
Note. Model F(6, 340) = 4.90, p < .0001, R2 = .08; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.42b 
Secularism ANCOVA results to the Competition stereotype items. 
Variable DF F Value p η2 
Sex 1 1.43 .23 .06 
Skin 1 0.06 .81 .003 
Veil 1 12.04 .001 .55 
Skin*Veil 1 8.15 .005 .37 
Secularism 1 0.13 .71 .006 
Note. Model F(5, 342) = 4.26, p = .0009, R2 = .06; η2 do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding. 
 
Summary of Secularism. General beliefs about secularism did not have any 
relevance to participants’ ratings of veiled and unveiled targets. The Secularism scale did 
not significantly interact with veil for any of the models and did not contribute to the 
models by increasing predictive power. On the other hand, beliefs in secularism that are 
specific to Muslims, as measured with the Secular Critique of Islam, interacted with veil 
in participants’ ratings of attraction (liking and the Attraction Index), similarity 
(understanding and sharing future plans), social distance, and moral outrage. The greater 
participants’ secular critique, the more negatively participants reacted to targets wearing a 
veil, relative to targets with no veil. The Secular Critique of Islam, but not a general 
belief in secularism, provides some explanation for social bias toward women who veil.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
As described in the previous chapters, the goals of this research were to develop a 
deeper understanding of social bias toward Muslim women who veil and to explore a 
unique way of measuring bias with a web experiment using photoshopped images. In this 
chapter I will provide a discussion of the results of this research. I will also address the 
limitations of the study, and provide directions for future research. 
Is there social bias toward women who veil?  
 There is no simple answer to this question.  I do find some support for my first 
hypothesis that as veil coverage increases, so does social bias. My research provides 
evidence that there is social bias against women who veil, but it is mostly among those 
people who hold anti-Muslim attitudes. For instance, in the cases of liking and friendship, 
the average ratings for targets with hijab, niqab, and no veil appear to be quite similar, 
and analysis showed no significant veil effect. The addition of a measure of fear of 
Muslims (Islamophobia-AB) to the analysis, however, helped show what is really going 
on.  Anti-Muslim attitudes moderate the relationship between liking and veiling.  Those 
participants with high anti-Muslim attitudes (one standard deviation above the mean) 
indicated, on average, a 49% chance of liking the target with no veil,  a 45% chance of 
liking the target with the hijab, and only a 41% chance of liking the target with the niqab.  
Those participants with tolerant attitudes toward Muslims (one standard deviation below 
the mean) showed a reverse pattern.  They indicated a 59% chance of liking the target 
with no veil 61% for the target with hijab, and 64% for target with niqab.  This kind of 
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pattern was found for many other variables, as discussed in the previous chapter. These 
findings support my fourth hypothesis that Islamophobia will moderate the impact of veil 
coverage on social bias; veiling is associated with more social bias among those with 
higher (versus lower) levels of Islamophobia.  
  On the other hand, in some cases, the results of the study were not as 
hypothesized. For instance, for the Attraction Index, independent of all other variables, as 
veil coverage increased so did attraction. In addition, when there was a significant 
Islamophobia X veil interaction, when participants expressed low Islamophobia, they 
indicated the least amount of social bias toward targets wearing the niqab, and the most 
social bias toward targets with no veil. It was hypothesized that in all cases, even when 
Islamophobia was low, that participants would report the most social bias toward targets 
wearing the niqab, followed by targets wearing the hijab, followed by targets with no 
veil. Some concepts that might help to explain these unexpected results include aversive 
racism and the principle of complementarity. 
 Aversive racism refers to forms of racism that are unpleasant to the people that 
hold them (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The effects of 
aversive racism on discrimination are explored in a study conducted by Nail et al. (2003), 
who in turn expanded a previous study conducted by Vrana and Rollock (1998). Both 
experiments utilized Dovidio and Gaertner’s (1998) Integrated Model of Racism, which 
proposed an integration between symbolic-modern and aversive models of racism. The 
researchers suggest that there is also a link between political orientation and racism. More 
specifically, they propose that political conservatism is tied to symbolic-modern racism 
while political liberalism is linked to aversive racism. These links are proposed on the 
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notions that conservatives’ private beliefs about race have been largely unaffected by 
contemporary societal norms and that they have basically learned not to express 
prejudiced attitudes in public settings. Nail (1986) calls this concept public compliance. 
Liberals, on the other hand, tend to go through a private conversion (Nail, MacDonald, & 
Levy, 2000) in which they internalize non-prejudiced social values and norms. While on 
a conscious level, liberals want a fair and inclusive society, on a subconscious level many 
continue to hold negative feelings toward minorities. While this model predicts that 
indirect measurements and certain laboratory experiments will result in higher levels of 
bias against minorities for both liberals and conservatives, when race and cues against 
discriminatory behavior are strong, the model makes different behavioral predictions for 
conservatives and liberals. The model suggests that European American conservatives 
should view an African American target more adversely than a European American 
target. European American liberals, in contrast, should respond with preferential 
treatment toward an African American target. This reverse-discrimination indicates that 
liberals, typically aversive racists, will make an extra effort to react favorably toward 
minorities in order to maintain a non-prejudiced self-image (Frey & Gaertner, 1986).  
 This notation of reverse-discrimination may be what is occurring when 
participants low on Islamophobia expressed the least amount of social bias toward the 
target wearing the niqab and the most amount of bias toward the target with no veil. 
Although this study did not have a measure of political affiliation, I would hypothesize 
that those low on Islamophobia would be politically liberal and therefore would be likely 
to be aversive racists. The low social bias rating toward veiled targets may reflect an 
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extra effort to express favorability toward minorities in order to preserve a non-
prejudiced self-image.  
 Another explanation that may help to explain higher attraction and similarity to 
veiled targets is the complementarity principle. Even though there has been much 
research to support the similarity-attraction principle (Berscheid &Reis, 1998), the 
complementarity principle supposes that people may be attracted to people whose 
characteristics complement their own. This principle reflects the old adage “opposites 
attract” (Fiske, 2010). Along similar lines, in some cases people are attracted to that 
which is exotic. This notion was proposed by Bem (1996), who suggested that children’s 
temperaments result in a preference to play either with same-sex or opposite-sex peers. 
Whichever sex they do not favor as a child becomes exotic to them and arousing, which 
elicits attraction. It should be noted that these fatal attractions, or those relationships 
based on dissimilarities, often dissolve. The differences and unique qualities that are 
initially appealing are often what causes the relationship to end (Felmlee, 1998). 
However, since participants are simply shown an image and asked to imagine knowing 
the target, my results could have captured some of this initial attraction based on the 
complementarity principle and attraction to the exotic. 
What kind of anti-Muslim attitude is most associated with bias toward women who 
veil?  
  
While I do find some support for my fourth hypothesis that Islamophobia and 
Secularism will moderate the impact of veil coverage on social bias and that veiling will 
be associated with more social bias among those with higher (versus lower) levels of 
Islamophobia and Secularism, not all measures of Islamophobia and Secularism are 
equal. This experiment helped to explore the various measures of Islamophobia. Overall, 
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the three measures of Islamophobia that I used (Islamophobia – AB, Islamophobia – CG 
and Islamoprejudice) (Lee et al., 2010, Irmhoff & Recker, 2012) performed similarly. 
When these measures interacted with veil coverage the relationships were comparable, 
which indicated that any of the three measures could be used to measure Islamophobia, or 
that the scales could be combined to create a single measure. The inclusion of 
Islamophobia – AB resulted in the most interactions with veil. As Islamophobia – AB 
increased, social bias toward veiled targets, especially targets wearing the niqab, 
increased most dramatically. These results suggest that Islamophobia can explain some 
social bias against women who wear the hijab, and especially the niqab, and that bias is 
best characterized by affective and behavioral factors as opposed to cognitive factors.  
The addition of measures of secularism did not greatly improve model strength 
and measures of secularism were rarely statistically significant predictors of social bias. 
Secular Critique of Islam, but not secularism in general, provides some explanation for 
bias against women who veil. While there were fewer interactions than with 
Islamophobia, the Secular Critique of Islam did have some interactions with veil 
coverage. These relationships were as hypothesized.  As Secular Critique of Islam scores 
increased, participants indicated more social bias toward veiled targets and less social 
bias to toward the target with no veil. Overall, secularism did not predict bias as well as 
the measures of Islamophobia. This finding has important implications. A concern that 
religion, specifically Islam, may interfere with government can be alleviated with 
education on how government function (e.g., the separation of church and state). 
However, fears and prejudices toward Muslims may be more irrational and therefore 
more difficult to address. 
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What are society’s stereotypes regarding women who veil?  
The results from this study expand on previous findings regarding stereotypes. 
Previous research conducted by Fiske, Bergsiecker, Russell, & Williams (2009) found 
that the combinations of perceived warmth and competence (low competence, low 
warmth; low competence, high warmth; high competence, low warmth; and high 
competence high warmth) result in different affective reactions: contempt, pity, 
admiration and envy. Based on their student sample, in regards to competence and 
warmth stereotypes, Muslims, along with other groups like Blacks, Hispanics, Native 
American and gay men, fell somewhere in the middle (medium competence, medium 
warmth).  
The researchers suggest that groups in the middle may be there for a variety of 
reasons. Groups may be in the middle because respondents do not have clear stereotypes 
about them or because there are conflicting stereotypes. Sometimes groups end up in the 
middle because the group is too broadly defined. For instance, Blacks end up in the 
middle, but when they are specified as poor blacks or black professionals they move to 
the lower left and upper right sections that represent contempt and pride, respectively. 
When Muslim women are specified, as in my study, Muslim women who veil fell into the 
low competence, low warmth quadrant, and targets wearing a niqab were rated as even 
lower competence and warmth than those wearing a hijab. Groups in this quadrant (e.g., 
poor, welfare recipients, and homeless) receive contempt from prejudiced people; they 
are neither liked nor respected and are seen as incompetent and cold (Fiske, 2010). These 
findings could reflect some common stereotypes of women who wear a veil. For instance, 
Bartkowski and Read (2003) suggest that that veil is seen as oppressive. If people view 
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women who veil as oppressed, they may also think that they are not very competent. 
Women who veil may also be regarded as reserved or closed-off, which aligns with the 
low warmth ratings. These stereotypes can be further explored in future research.  
Does skin color matter?    
 For three of the dependent variables, the estimated probability that participants 
would be able to understand the target’s personality fairly well, the Similarity Index and 
the Status stereotype items, the experimental manipulation of skin tone also produced the 
hypothesized effects. Participants indicated statistically lower similarity with dark 
skinned targets than light skinned targets. They also indicated that, as viewed by society, 
dark skinned targets have lower social status than light skinned targets. These findings 
support the notion of colorism, or the idea that light skinned people experience social 
privileges over dark skinned people. It should be noted that there were not as many 
statistically significant differences based on skin tone as there were for veil coverage, 
which could suggest that religion, as derived from veil coverage, is a stronger predictor of 
social bias than race, as derived from skin tone.  
 This research contributes to the existing literature on intersectionality by 
examining the intersections between skin tone and veil coverage in terms of social bias 
toward Muslim women who veil. For three (probability of coming from the same social 
background, Status and Competition) out of the fourteen dependent variables, there was a 
statistically significant skin tone X veil interaction. When there was a statistically 
significant skin tone X veil interaction, while the direction was as hypothesized (as veil 
coverage increased, so did social bias), the slope of the line was significantly steeper for 
light skinned targets. While it was hypothesized that dark skinned targets would 
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experience more social bias than light skinned targets, this was not found in my research. 
Examination of these interaction effects revealed that veil coverage carried more weight 
than skin tone. The light skin tone targets did not experience any privilege from their skin 
tone as evident in the significant increases in social bias as veil coverage increased. In 
fact, as veil coverage increased, targets with light skin tone experienced increased bias at 
a higher rate than targets with dark skin.  
Even though the results were not always as hypothesized, the factorial 
experimental design still allowed for an examination of the intersections between race 
and religion. In fact, this research expands on a previous web experiment (El-Geledi & 
Bourhis, 2012) by adding a skin tone dimension. In addition, previous research on 
intersectionality has been largely qualitative in nature.  This current research contributes 
to the understanding of intersectionality by exploring a quantitative measure of 
intersectionality.  Instead of conducting observation or qualitative interviews, I used a 
factorial web experiment in an attempt to develop a measure of intersectionality. Cho, 
Crenshaw, & McCall (2013) argue that the future of intersectionality studies will “be 
dependent on the rigor with which scholars harness the most effective tools of their trade 
to illuminate how intersecting axes of power and inequality operate to our collective and 
individual disadvantage.” I argue that experimental methodology is one of sociology’s 
most powerful tools.  I have used this tool to shed some light on the intersecting forms of 
bias experienced by Muslim women who veil. In addition, while it is beyond the scope of 
this research, future studies could consider additional intersections and further examine 
the impact of gender, sexual orientation, country of origin, native language, etc. on social 
bias toward Muslim women who veil.   
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Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 Overall, although many of my hypotheses were confirmed and the results of this 
study help to create a deeper understating of social bias toward Muslim women who veil, 
there were some limitations. First, in hopes of overcoming socially desirable responses, 
participants were deceived so that they were unaware of the true purpose of the study (see 
Chapter Three). Even though participants were led to believe that the study was on 
person perception and the focus was not on Muslim women who veil, over half of the 
participants (52%) reported that they were aware of the true purpose of the study in a 
post-survey question. This knowledge, along with the fact that participants were asked to 
self-report their answers to questions designed to measure social bias, creates the 
potential for socially desirable responses. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not acceptable 
to be openly prejudiced in contemporary American society (Schwartz, 2008), which 
could have led to dishonest answers and inaccurate measures of bias. Future research 
could follow up on this study by measuring social bias in indirect or implicit ways and 
seeing if similar results are found.  
 For example, some of the stereotype findings could be further examined with an 
Implicit Association Test (IAT). This test measures implicit attitudes, or those outside 
one’s conscious awareness, based on the strength of associations between concepts and 
evaluations or stereotypes. Using a measure of response latency, or reaction time, the 
ideas is that making a response is easier when closely related items share the same 
response key (Project Implicit, 2011). Future research could create an IAT both as an 
evaluation (good/bad) of Muslim women who veil and the further explore stereotypes, 
such as competence and warmth.  
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 Future research could also follow up on the intersections of race and religion for 
Muslim women who veil. While it is important to explore ways to quantitatively measure 
intersectionality, it is also necessary to note that “intersectionality focuses awareness on 
people and experiences” (MacKinnon, 2013). Such experiences may not be captured in a 
web survey, so a multi-method approach may be considered to create a complete 
understanding of the intersecting biases Muslim women who veil face. For instance, 
qualitative interviews could be conducted with Muslim women who veil in order to 
understand their experiences regarding social bias in American society. The results of the 
interviews could be compared with the results of this study to develop an even deeper 
understanding of social bias toward Muslim women who veil. In addition, future research 
could further consider the intersection of race/ethnicity. The target faces in this study 
resemble Arab Muslims. Future research could utilize target faces that reflect Asian or 
African Muslims to see how results compare. 
 While the experimental manipulation of veil coverage and skin tone resulted in 
statistically significant differences in social bias, the addition of the Islamophobia 
explained a majority of the variance the nine out of the fourteen dependent variables. 
Future research could explore other variables that might account for differences in ratings 
of social bias and how those variables may interact with the skin tone and veil factors. 
For instance, it would be useful to have a measure of political orientation, which could 
help to determine if aversive racism explains some of the unexpected findings. In 
addition, measures of religiosity, such as church attendance and involvement, and belief 
in or support for feminism may also help to explain variation in social bias toward 
Muslim women who veil. These variables could be added in addition to the Islamophobia 
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and secularism measures in order to gain a deeper understanding of the sources of social 
bias toward Muslim women who veil.  
Future research is needed to help explain why higher Islamophobia scores 
resulted in higher social bias ratings, even for the targets with no veil. Some possible 
explanations may be that Islamophobia is correlated with other traits such as Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA). Previous research has found that those high on RWA view the 
world as a dangerous place, which produces feeling of fear, hostility, and moral 
superiority (Fiske, 2010). While these feelings are often directed toward outgroup 
members (e.g., Duckitt, 1993), I suggest that they may extend more generally to any 
others, besides one’s self. Therefore, those high on Islamophobia, like those high on 
RWA, might be highly critical of others, which could result in more social bias.  
Overall, the model R2 values were not very high. None of the models had an R2 
over .30. This suggests that skin tone, veil, participant sex, and the measures of 
Islamophobia and secularism only predict a small amount of variance in social bias. 
These findings suggest that social bias is perhaps not best measured with self-report 
questions. Future research could explore other measures for social bias, such as the IAT 
described above. In addition, this research could be followed up with laboratory 
experiments or observation. Some examples may be to examine how likely people are to 
volunteer to help a Muslim organization or aid a Muslim women wearing a veil who 
requests assistance (Fiske, 2010).  
The results of the factor analysis for the secularism items also suggest that 
participants may have responded carelessly. The secularism section was the last section 
of the study before the demographic questions. Even though the study took no more than 
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ten minutes to complete, it is possible that participants experienced survey fatigue. Future 
research could examine the use of a short survey. Furthermore, as recommended by 
Schmitt and Stults (1985), the survey instructions may be edited to include a warning that 
some items may be negatively keyed and lengthy sets of items that utilize the same 
response format may be shortened.  
 Lastly, the results of this study are not generalizable beyond Iowa State 
University students. More specifically, since the student sample came from sociology and 
criminal justice classes, it must be considered that these particular students were not 
representative of Iowa State students, in general. Future research could follow up with a 
stratified random sample of Iowa State students including representation from all class 
years and majors. In addition, the study could be posted on a website like the Social 
Psychology Network, or even distributed nationally with a sample stratified by social 
class, education, race, religion, etc. in order to reach a sample of the American public. In 
some instances, participants in my sample reacted favorably toward veiled targets, this 
might not be the case for a sample from the general American public. Samples from these 
various populations would help to gain a more accurate picture of Americans’ bias 
toward Muslim women who veil. 
Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the results of this study have implications for both the 
measurement of social bias and the understanding of social bias toward Muslim women 
who veil. One strength of this research is the use of a web experiment to measure social 
bias. Through the use of random assignment, I have the ability to make causal statements 
regarding the experimental manipulation. Results suggest that veil coverage is an 
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important predictor of social bias. When controlling for all other variables, as veil 
coverage increased, so did social bias. There were also statistically significant differences 
in social bias based on skin tone. Participants reported significantly less similarity and 
understanding toward dark skinned targets than light skinned targets. Participants also 
suggested that dark skinned targets had significant less social status then light skinned 
targets. When the main effects skin tone and veil coverage interacted, social bias based 
on veil coverage was more pronounced for light skinned targets.  Still, social bias was 
better predicted by veil coverage than skin tone, which indicated that religion, as derived 
from veil coverage, was more important in predicting social bias than race, as derived 
from skin tone. This is an important finding when attempting to understand the main 
source of social bias toward Muslim women who veil.  
This research also makes an important contribution to the study of 
intersectionality by exploring a way of quantitatively studying the intersection of race and 
religion. In addition this research found that attitudinal measures, like Islamophobia, are 
important predictors of social bias toward Muslim women who veil. Islamophobia had an 
impact on veiled targets; as Islamophobia increased so did social bias. This was not the 
case for the target with no veil, in which Islamophobia had very little effect, which is 
apparent in the gradual slope. This study expanded on the findings of a previous web 
experiment (El-Geledi & Bourhis, 2012) by adding skin tone, as a dimension of race, to 
the examination of the effects of Muslim women’s veil coverage on social bias.   
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APPENDIX A 
INVITATION EMAIL 
Dear Student, 
 
You are invited to participate in a brief web study regarding person perception.  The 
survey has been approved by the Institutional Review Board and is being conducted by 
members of the Sociology Department at Iowa State University. 
 
Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary, and you can withdraw from the 
research by exiting the survey at any time without any penalty.  All of your responses 
will be kept confidential.  No personal identification will be associated with your 
responses in any reports of data.  
                                                     
Your responses to this survey are very important to success of this research.  We 
understand that you are very busy, and this survey will only take approximately 15 
minutes of your time. 
 
If you wish to participate in this research, please click the survey link below. 
 
Thank you for your time and cooperation in helping us conduct this research.  Should you 
have any further questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at 
amyshin@iastate.edu Or you can also contact Dr. Wendy Harrod, the advisor of this 
research, at wharrod@iastate.edu. 
 
Many thanks, 
 
Amy Shin 
 
Dr. Wendy Harrod 
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
Title of study: Person Perception 
 
Investigators: Amy L. Shin and Dr. Wendy Harrod 
 
This form describes a research project. It has information to help you decide whether or 
not you wish to participate. Research studies include only people who choose to take 
part—your participation is completely voluntary. 
 
Introduction:  
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how we perceive others. 
  
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are a current student at 
Iowa State University. You should not participate if you are under 18 years of age. 
 
Description of procedures:  
If you agree to participate in this study, you will view images and will be asked to 
respond to a series of questions regarding your attitudes toward the people in the photos. 
You will also be asked questions about religion and secularism. This study should take no 
more than 15 minutes to complete. 
  
Risks:  
While there are no foreseeable risks associated with this study, some of the study items 
may make you feel uncomfortable. If you feel uncomfortable at any point, you may 
immediately stop without penalty. 
  
Costs and Compensation: 
If your professor makes it available, you may receive extra credit points. It is hoped that 
information gained through this study will benefit society by generating a more complete 
understanding of how we perceive others. 
 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. Besides extra credit, if 
applicable, you will not be compensated for participating in this study. If you decide not 
to participate in this study, your professor will make another opportunity for extra credit 
available to you. 
  
Participant rights: 
Participating in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part in the 
study or to stop participating at any time, for any reason, without penalty or negative 
consequences. You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. Your choice 
of whether or not to participate will have no impact on you as a student in any way. 
 
If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, 
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please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, 
(515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
50011. 
  
Confidentiality: 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. However, 
federal government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, 
and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human 
subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy study records for quality assurance and 
data analysis. These records may contain private information. 
  
To further ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures 
will be taken: (a) your data will be combined with data collected from other participants 
so that no individual information can be identifiable, and (b) all records will be either 
kept in a locked filing cabinet or password protected computer files. 
  
Since responses will be anonymous, the investigators, faculty and your professor will not 
have any knowledge of individual responses. 
 
Questions: 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study. For further 
information about the study, contact Amy L. Shin at amyshin@iastate.edu or Dr. Wendy 
Harrod at wharrod@iastate.edu or 515-294-9898. 
  
  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE: 
By clicking “Next” below you are indicating that you are at least 18 years of age, 
that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been 
explained to you, and that you have been given the time to read the document and 
that your questions have been satisfactorily answered. Print this page if you wish to 
have a copy of this document for your records. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
COLLAGE OF FACES 
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APPENDIX D 
 
COLLAGE OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
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APPENDIX E 
 
DEBRIEGING DOCUMENT 
 
Thank you very much for completing this study! 
 
Purpose of the Study: Earlier in the study, you were informed you were participating in 
a study on person perception and that the purpose of the study was to gain a better 
understanding of how we perceive others. While this study is indeed about person 
perception, the main aim of the research is to better understand social bias by creating a 
measure of social bias toward Muslim women and understanding the source of such bias. 
 
Unfortunately, in order to accurately measure bias, we could not provide you with all of 
these details prior to your participation.  This ensures that your reactions in this study 
were spontaneous and not influenced by prior knowledge about the purpose of the study. 
If we had told you the actual purposes of our study, your responses could have been 
affected.  We regret withholding the full purpose of the study, and hope you understand 
the reason for it. 
 
Confidentiality: Please note that although the purpose of this study is more specific from 
the originally stated purpose, everything else on the consent form is correct.  This 
includes the ways in which we will keep your data confidential.  
 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. However, 
federal government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State University, 
and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human 
subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy study records for quality assurance and 
data analysis. These records may contain private information. 
  
To further ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures 
will be taken: (a) your data will be combined with data collected from other participants 
so that no individual information can be identifiable, and (b) all records will be either 
kept in a locked filing cabinet or password protected computer files. 
  
Now that you know the full purpose of our study and are fully informed, you may decide 
that you do not want your data used in this research.  If you would like your data 
removed from the study and permanently deleted please select the “remove my 
responses” button below. Whether you agree or do not agree to have your data used for 
this study, you will still extra credit for your participation. 
 
Questions and Concerns: 
  
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, its purpose or procedures 
please feel free to contact the researcher(s): Amy L. Shin at amyshin@iastate.edu or Dr. 
Wendy Harrod at wharrod@iastate.edu. 
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If you were upset by any of the questions in this study and would like to talk to a 
counselor, you may contact Iowa State University Student Counseling Services at 515-
294-5056 or visit the third floor of Student Services Building (north of Friley Hall). 
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APPENDIX F 
ISLAMOPHOBIA-AB AND ISLAMOPHIBIA-CG ITEMS 
Islam is the religious faith of Muslims. Please indicate the extent to which you 
disagree or agree with the following items about Islam. 
 
1. I would support any policy that would stop the building of new mosques (Muslim 
place of worship) in the U.S. (AB) 
 
2. If possible, I would avoid going to places where Muslims would be. (AB) 
3. I would become extremely uncomfortable speaking with a Muslim. (AB) 
4. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where Muslims could be. 
(AB) 
5. Just to be safe, it is important to stay away from places where Muslims could be. 
(AB) 
6. If I could, I would avoid contact with Muslims. (AB) 
7. If I could, I would live in a place where there were no Muslims. (AB) 
8. Muslims should not be allowed to work in places where many Americans gather 
such as airports. (AB) 
 
9. Islam is a dangerous religion. (CG) 
10. The religion of Islam supports acts of violence. (CG) 
11. Islam supports terrorist acts. (CG) 
12. Islam is anti-American. (CG) 
13. Islam is an evil religion. (CG) 
14. Islam is a religion of hate. (CG) 
15. I believe that Muslims support the killings of all non-Muslims. (CG) 
16. Muslims want to take over the world. (CG) 
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APPENDIX G 
 
ISLAMOPREJUDICE INDEX 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following items. 
 
1. I think it is wrong to see the Islamic world as united in its attitudes and values. 
 
2. Muslim cultures around the world have such fundamentally different values, that 
it is difficult to identify common aims and ideals. 
 
3. Islam and Christianity share the same universal ethical principles. 
 
4. Islam is an archaic religion, unable to adjust to the modern world. 
 
5. Compared to others, Muslims are rather irrational. 
 
6. Compared to other religious and philosophical approaches, Islam is rather 
primitive. 
 
7. I think the Islamic religion predisposes its followers to terrorism. 
 
8. Muslims and their religion are so different from us that it would be naive to 
demand an equal access to all positions in society. 
 
9. Wherever a large number of Muslims live and attend schools, Islamic religious 
education should be offered. 
 
SECULAR CRITIQUE OF ISLAM 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following items. 
 
1. The separation of church and state is an American ideal that Islam should accept. 
 
2. Although some women voluntarily wear a veil, for others it is a coercive dress 
code. 
 
3. Rigid Islamic gender role distinctions should not dictate how we teach physical 
education, provide medical services, or protect public safety. 
 
4. It is wrong to ignore the threat of fundamentalist Islam. 
 
5. Universal human rights and certain legal protections should always stand above 
religious rules. 
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6. As with any other religion one must criticize Islam and its leaders when they 
interfere with non-religious issues. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
SECULARISM ITEMS 
 
Secularism is the belief that religion should not play a role in government, education 
or other public parts of society. Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or 
agree with the following items about secularism. 
 
1. Religion has done more harm than good in the history of humankind. 
 
2. Religion should not dictate a way of living and a moral code for everyone. 
 
3. The fact that some people have religious objection to abortion, gay rights, 
evolution, etc. should not influence public policy for everyone. 
 
4. Public schools should teach religion and lead students in prayer to God. 
 
5. Religious symbols of any kind should be banned from public schools and 
government buildings. 
 
6. Government officials and judges should follow Christianity-based principles. 
 
7. The government should be independent of and hostile to religion of any kind. 
 
8. Individuals may be influenced by their personal religious beliefs but organized 
religion should stay out of the political process. 
 
9. Politicians should keep their religious beliefs to themselves and the state should 
not endorse any religious tradition. 
 
10. It is important for the President of the United States to have strong religious 
beliefs. 
 
11. Religious leaders should not endorse political candidates or discuss political 
issues. 
 
12. Religious groups have gone too far in trying to impose their religious values on 
the country. 
 
13. Circumcision of boys or girls is child abuse and should be banned. 
 
14. Animal sacrifice is barbaric and should be banned. 
 
15. Churches should stay out of politics. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
What is your age? 
 
 
What is your sex? 
Female 
Male 
 
Are you an international student? 
No 
Yes 
 
What is your classification in college? 
First Year 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Graduate Student 
Other 
 
 
What is your major area of study? 
Biological Sciences or Life Sciences 
Business 
Communications 
Computer & Information Science 
Criminal Justice 
Education 
Engineering 
Family Studies 
Health Professions or Related Sciences 
Humanities 
Liberal Arts 
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Mathematics 
Physical Sciences 
Psychology 
Sociology 
Other Social Sciences or History 
Visual or Performing Arts 
Other 
 
 
What college are you in? 
Agricultural and Life Sciences 
Business 
Design 
Engineering 
Human Sciences 
Liberal Arts and Sciences 
Veterinary Medicine 
Other 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
Hispanic or Latino 
Not Hispanic or Latino 
Unknown 
 
What is your race? 
American Indian/Alaska Native 
East Asian 
South Asian 
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
Black or African American 
White 
More than one race: Black/White 
More than one race: Other 
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Other or unknown 
 
What is your religious affiliation? 
 Christian - Protestant - Mainline Church  Buddhist - Theravada 
 
Christian - Protestant - Evangelical 
Church  
Buddhist - Tibetan 
 Christian - Protestant - Historical Black  Buddhist - Other 
 Christian - Catholic  Muslim - Shia 
 Christian - Mormon  Muslim - Sunni 
 Christian - Jehovah's Witness  Muslim - Other 
 Christian - Russian Orthodox Church  Hindu 
 Christian - Greek Orthodox Church  Unitarian 
 Christian - Other  New Age 
 Jewish - Reform  Native American Religion 
 Jewish - Conservative  Unaffiliated - Athiest 
 Jewish - Orthodox  Unaffiliated - Agnostic 
 Buddhist - Zen  Any other religion not listed above 
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APPENDIX J 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Independent Variables 
Name Description Variable Properties 
Skin 
Skin tone of randomly 
assigned image. Light skin or dark skin 
Veil 
Head covering of randomly 
assigned image. No veil, hijab or niqab 
Sex Participant sex Male (1) or female (0) 
Islamophobia - AB 
Affective-behavioral 
components of Islamophobia 
Sum of responses to 
eight items; values 
range from 8 to 40 
Islamophobia - CG 
Cognitive components of 
Islamophobia 
Sum of responses to 
eight items; values 
range from 7 to 40 
Islamoprejudice Islamoprejudice 
Average of nine items; 
values range from 1.33 
to 4.25 
Secular Critique Secular critique of Islam 
Average of six items; 
values range from 1 to 5 
Secularism 
Items designed to measure 
belief in secularism 
Average of 10 items; 
values range from 1 to 5 
Age Participant age 18 – 65+ 
International 
Participant international 
student status Yes or no 
Class Participant class year 
First year, sophomore, 
junior, senior, graduate 
student, other 
Major Participant major See Appendix I 
College Participant college See Appendix I 
Ethnicity Participant ethnicity See Appendix I 
Race Participant race See Appendix I 
Religion 
Participant religious 
affiliation See Appendix I 
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Dependent Variables 
Name Description Response Categories 
Attraction 1 Estimate the probability that 
you would like her and 
become friends with her. 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
Attraction 2 Estimate the probability that 
you would enjoy spending 
time with her. 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
Attraction 3 Estimate the probability that 
you would work with her on 
some project of mutual 
interest. 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
Attraction Index A single index of attraction 
based on ratings of: 
interesting-boring, 
unattractive-attractive, 
unselfish-selfish, unpopular-
popular, unconceited-
conceited, unintelligent-
intelligent, warm-cold, 
unsuccessful-successful, 
honest-dishonest, insincere-
sincere 
7-point scale; higher 
values indicate greater 
attraction 
Similarity Index A single similarity index 
based on the prompt: 
Compare yourself with this 
woman. For each trait, rate 
whether it is stronger in your 
personality or stronger in 
hers: interestingness, 
attractiveness, selfishness, 
popularity, conceitedness, 
intelligence, warmth, 
successfulness, honesty, 
sincerity. 
0 to 3; higher values 
indicate greater 
perceived similarity 
Similarity 1 Estimate the probability that 
she would turn out to come 
from the same social 
background as myself. 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
Similarity 2 Estimate the probability that 
I would be able to understand 
her personality fairly well. 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
Similarity 3 Estimate the probability that 
I would discover that her 
0 – 100%; 11-point 
scale 
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plans for the future are 
similar to my own. 
Social Distance Please select the highest 
degree of association you 
would desire to have with 
someone like her: 1 = to 
marry into my family, to 
have as best friend, to have 
as next-door neighbor, to 
work in the same office, , to 
have as a speaking 
acquaintance only, to have as 
visitor to my country, 7 = to 
keep out of my country. 
7-point scale; higher 
values indicate greater 
desired social distance 
Moral Outage And index created by 
averaging the responses to 
“Please indicate your 
reaction to members of this 
group:” should be banned – 
should be permitted, highly 
moral – highly immoral, 
highly upsetting – not at all 
upsetting, not at all sad – 
extremely sad, not at all 
tragic – tragic, not at all 
offensive – highly offensive, 
no anger – great deal of 
anger, very irrational – very 
rational, completely crazy – 
completely sane. 
7-point scale; higher 
values indicate higher 
moral outrage 
Competence An index of the following 
characteristics to the prompt: 
As viewed by society, how 
_______ is someone like 
her? Competent, confident, 
independent, competitive, 
intelligent.  
5-point scale; Not at all 
– extremely; higher 
values indicate higher 
perceived competence 
Warmth An index based on the 
average rating of the 
following characteristics to 
the prompt: As viewed by 
society, how _______ is 
someone like her? Tolerant, 
warm, good-natured, sincere 
5-point scale; Not at all 
– extremely; higher 
values indicate higher 
perceived warmth 
Status An index based on the 
average rating of the 
5-point scale; Not at all 
– extremely; higher 
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following characteristics to 
the prompt: As viewed by 
society: how prestigious are 
the jobs typically achieved 
by people like her, how 
economically successful 
have people like her been, 
how well educated are 
people like her? 
values indicate higher 
perceived status 
Competition An index based on the 
average rating of the 
following characteristics to 
the prompt: As viewed by 
society: if people like her get 
special breaks (such as 
preference in hiring 
decisions), this is likely to 
make things more difficult 
for people like me; the more 
power people like her have, 
the less power people like me 
are likely to have; resources 
that go to people like her are 
likely to take away from the 
resources of people like me. 
5-point scale; Not at all 
– extremely; higher 
values indicate higher 
perceived competition 
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APPENDIX K 
 
CORRELATION TABLE 
 
 
Sex Attraction 1 Attraction 2 Attraction 3 
Attraction 
Index Similarity 1 Similarity 2 
Sex 1.00       
Attraction 1 -.13* 1.00      
Attraction 2 -.14** .90*** 1.00     
Attraction 3 -.06 .68*** .71*** 1.00    
Attract Index -.18** .41*** .46*** .40*** 1.00   
Similarity 1 -.08 .35*** .27*** .22*** -.04 1.00  
Similarity 2 -.08 .59*** .57*** .51*** .28*** .47*** 1.00 
Similarity 3 -.21*** .49*** .50*** .41*** .22*** .51*** .64*** 
Similarity Index -.12* .29*** .29*** .23*** .20*** .05 .19** 
Social Distance .14** -.47*** -.51*** -.39*** -.34*** -.22*** -.43*** 
Moral Outrage .15** -.31*** -.35*** -.27*** -.30*** -.19** -.35*** 
Competence -.005 .11* .07 .09 .03 .34*** .16** 
Warmth .05 .06 .05 .12* .19** .15** .10* 
Status -.04 .07 .02 .05 .01 .34*** .06 
Competition .06 -.04 -.05 -.003 .05 -.21*** -.07 
Islamophobia - AB .22*** -.36*** -.39*** -.29*** -.26*** -.11* -.39*** 
Islamophobia - CG .15** -.29*** -.31*** -.24*** -.22*** -.13* -.33*** 
Islamoprejudice .11* -.33*** -.37*** -.23*** -.30*** -.06 -.31*** 
Secular Critique .04 -.07 -.03 .04 .02 -.09 -.05 
Secularism -.02 .03 .06 .12* .09 -.07 -.0005 
 
   
 
1
6
0 
 
Similarity 3 
Similarity 
Index 
Social 
Distance 
Moral 
Outrage Competence Warmth Status 
Sex        
Attraction 1        
Attraction 2        
Attraction 3        
Attraction Index        
Similarity 1        
Similarity 2        
Similarity 3 1.00       
Similarity Index .29*** 1.00      
Social Distance -.47*** -.29*** 1.00     
Moral Outrage -.32*** -.14** .41*** 1.00    
Competence .15** -.09 .01 -.04 1.00   
Warmth .13* -.07 -.02 -.15* .63*** 1.00  
Status .11* .02 .01 -.06 .63*** .47*** 1.00 
Competition -.08 -.06 .09 .13* -.17** -.18** -.19** 
Islamophobia AB -.33*** -.19** .48*** .43*** -.02 -.06 -.02 
Islamophobia CG -.29*** -.17** .39*** .41*** -.01 -.04 .05 
Islamoprejudice -.29*** -.22*** .45*** .41*** -.02 -.06 -.02 
Secular Critique -.07 -.08 .06 .14** -.02 -.02 -.06 
Secularism .02 .05 -.04 -.05 -.10 -.09 -.10 
 
 
 
   
 
1
6
1 
 Competition 
Islamo-
phobia AB 
Islamo-
phobia CD 
Islamo-
prejudice 
Secular 
critique 
Secularism 
Sex       
Attraction 1       
Attraction 2       
Attraction 3       
Attraction Index       
Similarity 1       
Similarity 2       
Similarity 3       
Similarity Index       
Social Distance       
Moral Outrage       
Competence       
Warmth       
Status       
Competition 1.00      
Islamophobia AB .16* 1.00     
Islamophobia CG .12* .76*** 1.00    
Islamoprejudice .14* .67*** .69*** 1.00   
Secular Critique .07 .12* .16** .14* 1.00  
Secularism .02 -.16** -.18** -.18** .39*** 1.00 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Ns range from 394 to 350 due to missing data.
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APPENDIX L 
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SECULARISM ITEMS 
Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation of secularism items. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
Secularism 1 .68 .30 
Secularism 2 .62 .46 
Secularism 3 .59 .54 
Secularism 4 .15 .83 
Secularism 5 .64 .15 
Secularism 6 .13 .83 
Secularism 7 .71 -.09 
Secularism 8 .59 .48 
Secularism 9 .64 .47 
Secularism 10 .18 .80 
Secularism 11 .67 .07 
Secularism 12 .72 .41 
Secularism 15 .73 .38 
 
Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis of secularism items with negatively keyed 
items removed.  
 
Item Factor 1 
Secularism 1 .74 
Secularism 2 .78 
Secularism 3 .79 
Secularism 5 .62 
Secularism 7 .56 
Secularism 8 .77 
Secularism 9 .80 
Secularism 11 .62 
Secularism 12 .83 
Secularism 15 .83 
 
